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UNCAPPING COMPENSATION IN THE GORE
PUNITIVE DAMAGE ANALYSIS
Shaakirrah R. Sanders*
ABSTRACT
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore rests, in part, on the “understandable
relationship” between a civil jury’s award of compensatory and punitive damages.
Gore designates Due Process a protectant against excessive civil jury awards, in ef-
fect outmaneuvering the civil jury trial right. Gore identifies three guideposts to de-
termine whether punitive damages are excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of
a defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between compensatory and punitive damages;
and (3) the difference between punitive damages and civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases.
This Article focuses on the second of Gore’s three guideposts, which examines
the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. In many states, compensa-
tory damages are automatically capped in certain categories of tort cases regardless
of proven damages. These states impose compensatory damage caps as a remedy for
excessive civil jury awards. But no preliminary finding of excessiveness triggers the
application of any cap. Except in one state, neither trial judges nor civil juries have
authority to determine the fairness of the cap’s application to the injured party.
This Article argues that the second Gore guidepost is based on a false premise
as it applies in states that have capped compensatory damages—that the plaintiff has
been fully reimbursed for actual losses. Gore fails to designate which compensatory
damage award constitutes the proper starting point for inquiry: the jury’s award or the
legislature’s capped award. Gore’s progeny rejects the argument that civil jury awards
were excessive, which is the major assumption justifying the existence of compensa-
tory damage caps. Gore’s progeny also warns that even if civil jury awards had be-
come excessive, compensatory damage caps constituted a misguided remedy. Because
there is no standard tort injury, it is inappropriate and impossible to settle upon a
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suitable amount to apply in all cases. Despite these warnings, some state legislatures
have continued to impose, and some state supreme courts have continued to uphold,
compensatory damage caps.
This Article contributes to existing scholarship on compensatory damage caps and
the Gore punitive damage analysis by identifying the defect that the former produces
in the latter. This Article maintains that capped compensation in state law tort actions
also caps the Gore punitive damage analysis. This Article advocates uncapping Gore
where a state’s procedures do not allow trial judges the opportunity to review a civil
jury’s award for reasonableness, where the civil jury has not been informed of the
cap’s existence, or where the civil jury has no opportunity to affirm an award that
exceeds the cap. Without such protections, Gore fails to advance its dual obligation
in civil litigation to protect defendants against unreasonably high awards and guard
severely injured plaintiffs against arbitrarily low awards.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore1 in a different con-
text than existing scholarship—by identifying compensatory damage caps as an
overlooked defect in the Gore punitive damage analysis. Gore rests, in part, on the
recognizable and “understandable” relationship between compensatory and punitive
damages.2 At its core is Gore’s assumption that the party entitled to punitive dam-
ages has been fully compensated for actual losses.3 But in many states, a jury’s award
of compensatory damages is automatically capped in certain categories of tort cases.4
These states argue that caps are an appropriate remedy for excessive civil jury awards.5
But no preliminary finding of excessiveness triggers application of a compensatory
1 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
2 See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991).
3 See generally Gore, 517 U.S. at 559.
4 David F. Maron, Statutory Damage Caps: Analysis of the Scope of Right to Jury Trial
and the Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on Noneconomic Damages, 32 MISS.
C. L. REV. 109, 110 (2013).
5 Noneconomic Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues
/noneconomic-damages-reform [http://perma.cc/4V2W-P3JQ].
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damage cap.6 Moreover, except in Massachusetts, neither trial judges nor civil juries
have authority to determine the fairness of the cap’s application to the injured party.7
In an effort to thwart rising insurance costs in the healthcare market, states in the
mid-1970s began to mechanically and automatically apply caps against compensa-
tory damage awards in certain categories of personal injury cases, most frequently
in medical malpractice cases.8 Haley Barbour, the former Governor of Mississippi,
pronounced excessive civil jury awards the cause of a medical malpractice crisis of
“unprecedented magnitude.”9 Professor Stephen Yeazell, a prominent contemporary
scholar on civil procedure, has described claims of such excessiveness as “political
theater.”10 Regardless of the veracity of Barbour’s claims, most state legislative
records offered little empirical evidence of long-lasting or systemic excessiveness.11
Instead, plaintiff attorneys were cast as villains; their clients: the undeserving bene-
ficiaries of a crippled and unfair system.12
The national healthcare debate has since shifted from whether excessive jury
awards caused a medical malpractice crisis to whether a crisis ever existed.13 In 2004,
a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study found that only 1.5% of people classi-
fied as likely victims of medical error actually brought a lawsuit.14 The CBO also
concluded that, based on research from the states, the primary effects of compensa-
tory damage caps were increased profitability for insurers and reduced recovery for
6  See infra notes 172–92 and accompanying text.
7 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2015) (allowing the jury to consider whether cap
is just and fair).
8 Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage
Caps, 2 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 397 (2005).
9 Haley Barbour, Haley’s PAC: Tort Reform, YOUTUBE (Nov. 29, 2010), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=AnfXuJ3hKlY. But see Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation:
The Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 347 (1995)
(describing “runaway juries” and the need to “curb excesses” as the impetus for state law
compensatory damage caps).
10 Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and
the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1755–64 (2013) (exploring
civil litigation and tort reform as a political controversy).
11 See infra notes 172–92 and accompanying text.
12 See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil
Justice Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 479 (1987) (discussing tort reform and its premises
that liability lawsuits have exploded and that civil juries were out of control). But see Yeazell,
supra note 10, at 1785 (discussing a study that found the effective hourly rate of plaintiff’s
attorney contingency fees only just slightly exceeded that of insurance defense lawyers).
13 See, e.g., Richard Anderson, Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance
Crisis, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 343, 343–48 (2013) (analyzing whether a
malpractice insurance crisis currently exists in the United States).
14 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES
18 (2004).
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plaintiffs.15 Missouri found its own reforms were likely to have disproportionately
burdened the young, the economically disadvantaged, and those who were most se-
verely injured.16 These classes of plaintiffs are least likely to have the means to pay
the upfront costs of bringing a colorable claim for personal injury.
Despite well-established doubt as to the existence of a medical malpractice crisis,
states have continued to impose and enforce compensatory damage caps.17 Not all
states have imposed caps. But what constitutes an “excessive” civil jury award varies
widely, as the amounts of recovery in cap regimes range between $250,000 and
$3 million.18 Caps have been most frequently applied in medical malpractice and
wrongful death lawsuits, but some caps apply to all tort cases. Caps also vary with
regards to type.19 The most common type of cap applies to noneconomic damages,
which includes damages related to pain, suffering, mental anguish and other emotional
distresses, disfigurement, and the loss of consortium or capacity to enjoy life.20 Other
caps apply more broadly to economic damages, which includes damages related to
medical expenses, lost earnings, and other objectively verifiable monetary losses.21
Some compensatory damage caps have been overturned, some have been upheld,
and others remain unchallenged under various provisions of state constitutions.22
This Article focuses on state constitutional civil jury trial litigation and the implica-
tions of capped compensation on the Gore punitive damage analysis. Cap-approving
courts hold that legislative authority includes the power to alter common law rights
to compensatory damages.23 Cap-disapproving courts hold that legislatures cannot
deny the right to a civil jury’s award of compensation in common law cases.24 The
crux of the debate among state supreme courts is whether caps intrude on the civil
jury’s constitutionally proscribed fact-finding role to assess responsibility for an injury.
In short, states disagree whether the civil jury’s award is fully enforceable.
State supreme courts also disagree on the underlying policy justifications for com-
pensatory damage caps—excessive civil jury awards. Most state legislative records
lack evidence of jury bias or widespread and systematic excessiveness. Except in
15 Id. at x, 12.
16 Id. at 4.
17 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West
2008).
18 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15; see
also infra notes 174–81 and accompanying text.
19 JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 6.5, at 37 (2d ed. 2006).
20 Id. at 36–37.
21 Id. at 36.
22 Maron, supra note 4, at 110.
23 See, e.g., DRD Pool Serv. v. Freed, 5 A.3d 45, 50 n.5 (Md. 2010) (declining to overrule
a previous decision that statutory cap on noneconomic damages violated the common law
right to a civil jury trial).
24 See, e.g., Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E. 2d 218 (Ga. 2010)
(striking down a compensatory cap for violating the common law right to a civil jury trial).
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Massachusetts, the cap automatically applies despite the jury’s finding that the plain-
tiff is entitled to a higher compensatory damage award.25 Application of most caps
is not triggered by a finding of excessiveness and trial judges are stripped of any
authority to determine whether application of the cap is just or fair. Caps apply re-
gardless of: (1) the nature of the injury; (2) the degree or length of pain, suffering,
disfigurement, or mental anguish experienced by the injured party; and (3) the in-
jured party’s age or other personal characteristics that directly relate to the entitle-
ment to compensation.26
Although the state supreme courts’ split on the constitutionality of compensa-
tory damage caps is troubling, so too is the application of capped compensation in
the Gore punitive damage analysis. Prior to Gore, the Court remained unpersuaded
that large proportions between punitive and compensatory damages were unreason-
able.27 The Court also declined to draw a “mathematical bright line” between con-
stitutionally acceptable and unacceptable awards.28 Instead, the jury’s award was
entitled to a strong presumption of validity.29 Pre-Gore, the Court limited review of
punitive damages to a determination of whether the award lacked objective criteria,
whether the jury was properly instructed, and whether the award was subject to a
meaningful post-verdict hearing.30
Gore represented a significant departure from its predecessors and established
three guideposts to determine whether a civil jury’s punitive damage award was
reasonable: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s misconduct; (2) the
disparity between compensatory and punitive damages; and (3) the difference be-
tween punitive damages and civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases.31 Later in State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell,32 the
Court articulated five subfactors that applied to an examination of the first Gore
guidepost—degree of reprehensibility.33 The Court also clarified the second Gore
guidepost—the disparity between compensatory and punitive damages.34 On this
25 See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments:
A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary
Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1121–22 (1995) (discussing how caps
apply regardless of the specific facts of the case).
26 See generally id. at 1122.
27 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991).
28 TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 433, 453–66 (1993).
29 Id. at 457, 463–65.
30 See, e.g., id. at 444–45.
31 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).
32 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
33 Id. at 419. These subfactors included: (1) whether the harm was physical versus eco-
nomic; (2) whether the harm involved indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or
safety of others; (3) whether the harm was to financially vulnerable victims; (4) whether the
harm involved repeated actions rather than an isolated incident; and (5) whether the harm
was the result of intentional conduct, rather than an accident. Id.
34 Id. at 425–26.
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factor, the Court reasoned that punitive damages must be “both reasonable and
proportionate to the amount of harm” suffered by the plaintiff and “the general
damages recovered.”35
Gore implied, and Campbell explicitly presumed, that plaintiffs who were
entitled to punitive damages had been made whole by an award of compensatory
damages,36 which is false in states that cap compensation. Gore’s presumption was
based in part on the distinction between compensatory and punitive damages.37
According to the Court, damages should be triggered by application of the law
rather than caprice.38 Damages should also be based upon the facts and circum-
stances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.39 In this respect, the
Gore punitive damage analysis appears woefully ignorant of the existence of com-
pensatory damage caps. As a result, the Court has failed to designate which compen-
satory damage award constitutes the proper starting point for the second Gore
guidepost—the jury’s award or the legislature’s capped award. If the starting point
is the latter, then the second Gore guidepost is arbitrarily skewed in cap regimes.
This Article argues that compensatory damage caps also cap the Gore punitive
damage analysis. This effect has been largely ignored by current scholarship. Gore’s
progeny overtly rejected the major assumption justifying the existence of most
caps—that civil jury awards had become excessive.40 The Court also cautioned that
even if excessiveness existed, caps do not constitute a proper remedy.41 The Court
has explained that there were no standard tort injuries and thus it would be inappro-
priate and impossible to settle upon a suitable damage amount that applied in all
cases.42 Despite the Court’s counsel, states have continued to impose and uphold
compensatory damage caps.
In Part I, this Article discusses Gore, its predecessors, and its progeny, which
confirm substantive due process as a protectant against excessive damage awards.
Part I also examines Gore’s excessiveness test for punitive damages and concludes
that state law compensatory damage caps create a fundamental defect in the Gore
punitive damage analysis. In Part II, this Article describes state law compensatory
damage caps. Part II also discusses civil jury trial litigation on the constitutionality
of caps, which reveals a fundamental disagreement among states about the nature
and scope of the civil jury trial right. In Part III, this Article argues that compensa-
tory damage caps also cap the Gore punitive damage analysis. Part III advocates
uncapping compensation in the Gore excessiveness test under three circumstances.
35 Id. at 426.
36 Id.; Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
37 See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425–26; Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75.
38 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426.
39 Id.
40 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497–98 (2008).
41 Id. at 497–99.
42 Id. at 506.
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First, Gore should be uncapped where procedures do not allow trial judges the op-
portunity to review a civil jury’s award for reasonableness (or if the trial judge has
had such opportunity and confirms an award that exceeds the cap). Second, Gore
should be uncapped if the civil jury has not been informed of the existence of a
compensatory damage cap (or if the civil jury has been so informed but still awards
damages that exceed the cap). Finally, Gore should be uncapped where the civil jury
has no opportunity to reconsider or confirm an award that exceeds the cap (or where
the civil jury has had such opportunity and affirmed an award that exceeds the cap).
Part III concludes that without such protections, Gore fails to advance its dual ob-
ligation in civil litigation: to protect civil defendants against unreasonably high
awards, and to guard severely injured plaintiffs against arbitrarily low awards.
I. THE GORE PUNITIVE DAMAGE ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court has long contended with the issue of exces-
sive civil jury awards of punitive damages.43 But only on a few occasions before
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore did the Court express doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of a punitive damage award in an individual case.44 For many years exces-
siveness challenges were rejected or deferred.45 For example, in Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,46 the Court rejected the applica-
bility of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause to punitive damage awards
in civil cases between private parties.47 Claims of excessiveness under substantive
due process were also rejected, but only because the issue was not raised in the
lower courts.48 Still the Court made clear that due process imposed “some limits” on
punitive damages that were the “product of bias or passion,” or if the jury’s award
“was reached in proceedings lacking the basic elements of fundamental fairness.”49
The Court’s punitive damage jurisprudence has long recognized an “under-
standable relationship” between compensatory and punitive damages, but initially
that relationship was incoherent and unclear as to the required nexus between
awards.50 For some time, the Court rejected arguments that large ratios between
punitive and compensatory damages were unconstitutional.51 This approach was best
43 Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punitive
Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525, 526 (2011).
44 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 9 (1991).
45 Id. at 12.
46 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
47 Id. at 271.
48 Id. at 276–77; see also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) (re-
jecting a challenge to a punitive damage award on due process grounds where the argument
was not raised on appeal in lower state court).
49 Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 277.
50 Pac. Mut., 499 U.S. at 22.
51 Id. at 23–24.
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demonstrated in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Haslip, where punitive
damages awarded by an Alabama jury amounted to more than four times the amount
of compensatory damages and two hundred times the amount of the plaintiff’s out-
of-pocket expenses.52
Regardless of the understandable relationship between compensatory and punitive
damages, Pacific Mutual acknowledged that punitive damages had long been part
of American tort law.53 The Court also approved of American tort law’s adoption of the
common law approach to awarding damages.54 In the common law, the issue of
damages was first submitted to the jury after which the award was subjected to a
reasonableness review by trial and appellate courts.55 Thus in Pacific Mutual, the
Court focused primarily on whether Alabama’s procedures properly guided the jury.56
The Court reasoned the jury’s punitive damage award did not lack objective criteria
because the defendant had the full benefit of Alabama’s procedural protections.57 At
52 Id. at 23. Pacific Mutual concerned an action against a life insurer and an agent for
fraud. Id. at 6. The insured claimed that the agent continued to accept premium payments
from insureds even though the policy had been cancelled without notice to the insureds. Id.
at 5. Specifically, Ruffin was an agent for both Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company and
Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company, which were distinct and nonaffiliated entities. Id.
at 4. Representing himself as an agent for Pacific Mutual, Ruffin solicited Roosevelt City for
both health and life insurance on behalf of the city’s employees. Id. Ruffin prepared
applications for the city and its employees for life insurance with Pacific Mutual and health
insurance with Union. Id. Union sent its billings for health premiums to Ruffin at his Pacific
Mutual office in Birmingham, Alabama, where Ruffin worked. Id. at 5. The city did the same
with regards to the premium payments. Id. Ruffin ultimately misappropriated the funds and
Union notified the agent in charge of Pacific Mutual’s Birmingham office about the lapse in
health coverage. Id. Pacific Mutual’s agent did not forward the notices to the city, which
remained unaware that the health policies had been cancelled for its employees. Id. Suit was
brought against Pacific Mutual and Ruffin by a city employee who was denied health cov-
erage by Union and was unable to pay a judgment for medical expenses. Id. at 5–6. The case
against Pacific Mutual was brought under the theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 6.
53 Id. at 15.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 19. The Court noted that, although Alabama granted the civil jury discretion in
determining punitive damages, such discretion was no greater than that pursued in many
other areas of law. Id. at 20. “As long as [such] discretion was exercised within reasonable
constraints, due process [was] satisfied.” Id.
57 Id. Alabama’s procedural protections also included a comparative analysis of other
punitive damages to ensure a reasonable relationship with the goals of deterrence and retri-
bution. Id. at 20–21. Additionally, the Alabama Supreme Court took into account the following
criteria to determine whether the award was excessive or inadequate:
(a) whether there was a reasonable relationship between the punitive
damage award and the harm likely to result from the defendant’s con-
duct as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the duration of that conduct,
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the very least, states must have properly instructed the jury and must have conducted
a post-verdict hearing review to ensure damages were constitutional.
TXO Production Corporation v. Alliance Resources Corporation58 also demon-
strated, but did not fully articulate the “understandable relationship” between com-
pensatory and punitive damages.59 In TXO Production Corporation, a West Virginia
jury awarded $19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive dam-
ages on a common law claim for slander of title.60 The Court rejected the notion that
the 526-to-1 ratio between punitive and compensatory damages was per se excessive
and declined to draw a “mathematical bright line” between constitutionally acceptable
and unacceptable awards for every case.61 Instead, the Court described the punitive
damage award against TXO as “close to the line of constitutional permissibility,”62
but not close enough to “jar . . . constitutional sensibilities.”63 The Court also looked
to whether West Virginia’s procedures for awarding punitive damages were funda-
mentally fair.64 Although the trial court did not articulate the basis for denying TXO’s
the defendant’s awareness, any concealment, and the existence and
frequency of past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant of the
wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of
having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the ‘financial position’ of
the defendant; (e) all costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal
sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in miti-
gation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant
for the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
Id. at 21–22. According to the Court, these criteria demonstrated that sufficiently definite and
meaningful constraints were placed on the discretion of Alabama juries in awarding punitive
damages. Id. at 22.
58 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
59 Id. at 443–66.
60 Id. at 446. TXO Production Corporation involved a joint oil and gas development
project between TXO and Alliance whereby TXO’s geologists concluded that the recovery
of oil and gas on a tract of land controlled by Alliance would be “extremely profitable.” Id.
at 447. Shortly after an agreement was signed by the parties, TXO’s attorneys discovered that
mineral rights in the tract at issue had been conveyed to a third party by Alliance’s predecessor
in interest. Id. at 448. TXO advised Alliance that Alliance’s leasehold interest to oil and gas
rights on the tract failed despite TXO’s knowledge that such claim was “frivolous.” Id. at
448–49. TXO then attempted to obtain the leasehold interest to the oil and gas rights on the
tract by way of a quitclaim deed, which TXO eventually recorded without notice to Alliance.
Id. at 449. TXO ultimately filed suit after its attempt to renegotiate the royalty agreement
with Alliance failed. Id. According to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, TXO’s
lawsuit was an unsuccessful attempt to renegotiate royalty payments and thereby “increase
its interest in the oil and gas rights” to the tract. Id. Alliance responded to TXO’s lawsuit by
filing a counterclaim for slander which was successfully tried before a jury. Id. at 450–51.
61 Id. at 458.
62 Id. at 459.
63 Id. at 462.
64 Id. at 457.
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motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for remittitur as to the puni-
tive damage award, such failures did not constitute a constitutional violation.65 Thus,
the jury’s award was entitled to a strong presumption of validity, which TXO failed
to adequately rebut considering the amount at stake and TXO’s bad faith as evi-
denced by a pattern of fraud, trickery, and deceit.66
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore finally articulated the “understandable
relationship” between compensatory and punitive damages and pronounced a tan-
gible framework for analyzing the reasonableness of punitive damage awards.67
Gore involved a claim for failing to disclose predelivery damage to a car sold as
new when in fact the car had been repainted before the sale.68 A civil jury awarded
$4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages based on the
finding that BMW’s nondisclosure of the presale repainting constituted gross,
oppressive, or malicious fraud.69 The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive
award to $2 million because the jury’s computation of damages improperly consid-
ered conduct beyond Alabama’s jurisdiction.70
As noted by Justice Ginsburg, Gore represented the Court’s first invalidation of
a civil jury’s punitive damage award.71 Gore required punitive damages to be rea-
sonable and measured rationality as that which was necessary to vindicate the
State’s legitimate interest to protect its own citizens.72 Gore illuminated three
guideposts to analyze reasonableness and rationality in an individual case: (1) the
degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s misconduct;73 (2) the disparity between
65 Id. at 465.
66 Id. at 457, 465.
67 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 433).
68 Id. Dr. Ira Gore, Jr.’s discovery of the deception was unlikely, except he sought to
make his BMW sports sedan “snazzier.” Id. at 563. Mr. Slick, proprietor of the independent
detailer “Slick Finish,” informed Dr. Gore that the car had been repainted. Id. Feeling he had
been cheated, Dr. Gore brought a lawsuit for compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
69 Id. at 565. At trial, BMW acknowledged its “nationwide policy” of selling cars as new
if predelivery damage did not exceed 3% of the suggested retail price. Id. at 563–64. This
policy began in 1983. Id. According to BMW, the cost of repainting Dr. Gore’s car was
$601.37, or 1.5% of the suggested retail price. Id. at 564.
70 Id. at 567. Dr. Gore presented evidence that BMW sold 983 refurbished cars as new,
but only 14 of those were sold within Alabama. Id. at 564.
71 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 430–31 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
72 Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
73 Id. at 574–75. The Court labeled degree of reprehensibility the most important
indicium of reasonableness and reasoned that punitive damages should reflect the enormity
of the defendant’s offense. Id. at 575. Drawing an analogy from criminal law, the Court
opined that “some wrongs are more blameworthy than others.” Id. 575–76 (describing
nonviolent crimes as “less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence”)
(citation omitted). The Court was unconvinced that BMW should be treated as a recidivist
primarily because BMW’s misrepresentations were immaterial. Id. at 579.
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compensatory and punitive damages;74 and (3) the difference between punitive
damages and civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.75 Gore
ultimately found the $2 million punitive award so “grossly excessive” that it tran-
scended constitutional limits.76 This finding was based on the fact that damages were
purely economic77 and on the “breathtaking” 500-to-1 ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages.78
Clarification of Gore’s first two guideposts was provided in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell,79 which also involved a successful
excessiveness challenge to a punitive damage award.80 Campbell arose after personal
injuries were sustained in an automobile accident81 for which State Farm’s insured
was found liable.82 State Farm refused to cover the $185,849 damage award or fur-
ther indemnify its insured even after refusing a pretrial settlement offer of $50,000.83
Claims of bad-faith failure to settle an insurance matter, fraud, and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress were brought against State Farm.84 Judgment was en-
tered in the amount of $2.6 million for compensatory damages and $145 million for
74 Id. at 574–75. The Court described this as the second most commonly cited indicium
of reasonableness. Id. at 580. The Court defined the proper inquiry as asking whether there
was a reasonable relationship between the punitive damage award and the harm that is likely
to result or that actually resulted from the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
While the constitutional line is not marked by a simple mathematical formula, the relevant
ratio should not exceed 10-to-1. Id. However, the Court conceded that such a line would not
fit every case. Id. at 582. For example, a low compensatory award may support a higher ratio
where particularly egregious acts result in only a small amount of economic damage. Id. A
higher ratio between compensatory and punitive damage awards may be justified in cases
where the injury or noneconomic damage was hard to detect or monetize. Id.
75 Id. at 574–75.
76 Id. at 585–86.
77 Id. at 576.
78 Id. at 582–83.
79 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
80 Id. at 412.
81 Id. at 412–13. Curtis Campbell arguably caused a collision when he decided to pass
six vans traveling ahead of him on a two-lane highway. Id. at 412. As Campbell approached,
an oncoming driver lost control of his automobile and collided with a third vehicle. Id. at
412–13. While Campbell escaped without injury, the third driver was killed and the second
driver, who swerved to avoid Campbell, was permanently disabled. Id. at 413. Campbell
denied fault, which may have been supported by early investigations. Id.
82 Id. at 413.
83 Id. State Farm declined offers to settle at the policy limit of $25,000 per injured driver,
of which there were two. Id. After the trial, State Farm advised Campbell to sell his property
to “get things moving.” Id.
84 Id. at 413–14. Pending appeal, Campbell entered into a settlement whereby the plain-
tiffs agreed not to pursue enforcement of the prior damage award in exchange for Campbell’s
pursuit of a bad-faith action against State Farm. Id. Campbell also promised the accident
victims 90% of any award against State Farm in the subsequent litigation. Id.
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punitive damages.85 The trial court reduced the awards to $1 million and $25 million,
respectively.86 The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damage
award, but agreed compensatory damages amounted to $1 million.87 The Campbell
Court affirmed that procedural and substantive constitutional limits applied to
damage awards and held that due process prohibited punishment that was grossly
excessive or arbitrary.88
Campbell articulated five subfactors that applied to an examination of the first
Gore guidepost—degree of reprehensibility.89 These subfactors included: (1) whether
the harm was physical versus economic; (2) whether the harm involved indifference
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; (3) whether the harm was
to financially vulnerable victims; (4) whether the harm involved repeated actions
rather than an isolated incident; and (5) whether the harm was the result of inten-
tional conduct, rather than an accident.90
Campbell also clarified the second Gore guidepost—the disparity between
compensatory and punitive damages. On this factor the Court reasoned that the
measure of punishment must be both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the general damages recovered.91 The Court also
mandated that single-digit ratios or multipliers between compensatory and punitive
damages were more likely to comport with due process.92 The Campbell Court ulti-
mately found the reinstated punitive damage award excessive.93
Campbell expanded Gore and explicitly presumed that “a plaintiff ha[d] been
made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages.”94 This presumption was
based in part on the distinction between compensatory damages, which were “intended
to redress the concrete loss”95 and punitive damages, which were awarded only where
further sanctions were necessary to achieve the goals of deterrence and retribution.96
85 Id. at 415.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 416.
89 Id. at 419.
90 Id. In its application of the subfactors to the facts, the Court conceded that State Farm’s
conduct merited no praise, but “a more modest punishment for [State Farm’s] reprehensible
conduct could have satisfied the State’s legitimate objectives.” Id. at 419–20. The Court was
also unconvinced that State Farm should be treated as a recidivist. Id. at 423.
91 Id. at 426. The Court reaffirmed there was no bright-line ratio which a punitive damage
award cannot exceed. Id. at 425.
92 Id. The Court identified single-digit multipliers as sufficient to achieve a State’s goals
of deterrence and retribution. Id. The Court reasoned that the 145-to-1 ratio involved in
Campbell was presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 426.
93 Id. at 429.
94 Id. at 419.
95 Id. at 416 (citing Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)).
96 Id. (citing Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432).
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According to Campbell, damages should be triggered by application of the law
rather than caprice.97 Campbell also made clear that punitive damage awards “must
be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm
to the plaintiff.”98 Campbell maintained that “Gore must be implemented to ensure
both reasonableness and proportionality.”99
Gore, and by extension Campbell, appear woefully ignorant of compensatory
damage caps. Professors David Baldus, John MacQueen, and George Woodworth
agree, and argue that caps are “completely unrelated to the level of compensable
harm suffered by the plaintiff.”100 But Campbell assumes recovery of damages
dictated by the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to
the plaintiff.101 Campbell also assumes compensatory damages represent the amount
of harm suffered by the plaintiff.102 A damage award pursuant to a compensatory
damage cap rebuts both assumptions and directly implicates the second Gore guide-
post, which measures the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.103
Neither Gore nor Campbell designate which award constitutes the proper starting
point for the second Gore guidepost—the jury’s award of compensatory damages
or the legislature’s “capped” compensatory damage award. If the answer is the latter,
then the ratio that constitutes the second Gore guidepost is undoubtedly skewed in
cap regimes. Moreover, a compensatory award that is dictated by a damage cap ignores
the connection in the common law and in the United States legal tradition between
the severity of harm and the amount of damages. This undermines the relationship
between compensatory and punitive damage awards, which in cap regimes is no
longer understandable.
Gore and Campbell also ignore that capped compensation results in a procedure
where compensatory damage awards are no longer closely aligned with their tradi-
tional purpose—to compensate for actual losses or injuries. No evidence suggests
that current procedures for selecting a civil jury lack sufficient safeguards.104 In fact,
there are many procedural safeguards that apply to the jury selection process.105
97 Id. (citing Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436).
98 Id. at 425. The Court noted that based on the facts of the case, Campbell received
“complete compensation.” Id. at 426. The Court reasoned that Campbell’s injuries were
economic, not physical, and of only a temporary duration. Id. The Court also opined that the
damage awards were likely duplicative because much of the distress Campbell suffered was
a component of both compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
99 Id. at 428.
100 Baldus et al., supra note 25, at 1122–23 (arguing that compensatory damage caps do
little more than “shift the costs of accidents from defendants to injured plaintiffs as a means
of reducing insurance premiums”).
101 See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425–26.
102 Id. at 416.
103 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
104 TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 433, 456–57 (1993).
105 Id. at 456.
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First, the trial court (as well as the parties) must be satisfied that each individual
juror is impartial and unbiased.106 Next, the jury engages in a process of collective
deliberation of the evidence and the arguments of the parties.107 The trial judge acts
as gatekeeper by determining the admissibility of evidence and the applicable law.108
The trial judge has also heard all of the testimony and is in a position to review the
jury’s assessment of the award.109 Finally, an appellate court has authority to affirm
or overturn the entire process if an error has occurred.110 Compensatory damage caps
displace this process.111 Instead, a legislative determination of damages applies uni-
formly and with no consideration of the facts.112 As argued by Baldus, MacQueen, and
Woodworth, such legislative interference intrudes into the domain of judicial and
jury decision making.113
Recent applications of Gore and Campbell confirm the importance of procedures
for awarding damages in civil cases. Phillip Morris USA v. Williams114 concerned
claims of negligence and deceit brought by the widow of a cigarette smoker.115 The
civil jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $821,000 on the claim
of deceit, of which $21,000 constituted economic damages and $800,000 constituted
noneconomic damages.116 The jury also awarded punitive damages in the amount of
$79.5 million,117 but the trial judge found that award excessive and reduced it to
$32 million.118 Both the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court
rejected the trial court’s finding of excessiveness and upheld the jury’s original
award.119 The Phillip Morris Court affirmed that federal constitutional limits apply
106 Id.
107 Id. at 456–57.
108 Id. at 457.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See Baldus et al., supra note 25, at 122.
112 See id.
113 See id. at 1169–70 (describing the difficulty of identifying the high and low dollar
range of reasonableness).
114 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
115 Id. at 349.
116 Id. at 350. The jury found that Mr. Williams’s death was caused by smoking, a habit
he developed in part “because he thought it was safe to do so.” Id. at 349. The jury also
found that Phillip Morris knowingly and falsely led Mr. Williams to believe that smoking
was safe. Id. at 350. This ultimately led the jury to find that Phillip Morris was negligent and
had engaged in deceit. Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 350–52. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Phillip Morris’s arguments that
(1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that punitive damages could not be
awarded to nonparties, and (2) the 100-to-1 ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages was grossly excessive in light of Gore and Campbell. Id. at 350–51.
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to procedures for awarding damages.120 While states have flexibility to determine
what kind of procedures to implement, federal constitutional law required some
form of protection from excessiveness and arbitrariness.121 Phillip Morris acknowl-
edged as legitimate Oregon’s respect for civil jury awards, but emphasized the
necessity of avoiding procedures that unnecessarily deprived a jury of proper legal
guidance.122 The Court ultimately remanded the matter for a review of Oregon’s pro-
cedures, specifically whether part of the punitive award was based on harm caused
to nonparty victims.123
Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker involved issues of federal maritime law, but
offered direct insight into what federal constitutional limits applied to procedures
governing civil jury awards.124 Exxon Shipping concerned a punitive damage award
that resulted from the 1989 grounding of an oil supertanker in Alaska.125 The jury’s
award was based in part on evidence that eleven hours after the accident the super-
tanker’s captain registered a .061 blood alcohol level.126 At trial, experts predicted
that at the time of the accident the captain’s blood-alcohol level was three times the
legal driving limit in most states.127 Exxon disputed this evidence,128 as well as its
knowledge that the captain had relapsed after failing to complete a rehabilitation
120 Id. at 352–53; see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15–22 (1991) (dis-
cussing requirement that procedures be adequate).
121 Phillip Morris, 549 U.S. at 357. The Court reasoned that the amount of damage should
not be the result of arbitrary decision making or “a decision maker’s caprice.” Id. at 352; see
also id. at 354 (referring to Gore and Campbell as addressing fundamental due process
concerns about arbitrary damage awards).
122 Id. at 355.
123 Id. at 353–54 (affirming the rule that an award of punitive damages cannot serve the
purpose of punishing the defendant for harm to non-party victims).
124 554 U.S. 471, 506 (2008) (“One option would be to follow the states that set a hard
dollar cap on punitive damages.”).
125 Id. at 476–79. The approximately 900-foot tanker was carrying 53 million gallons of
crude oil from the end of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to the lower 48 states. Id. at 476. Before
the accident, the ship’s captain, Joseph Hazelwood, set the tanker to autopilot and left the
bridge to “do paperwork.” Id. at 477. A third mate was left alone on the bridge although pro-
tocol required two officers. Id. at 478. Hazelwood was the only person on the ship licensed
to navigate the area where the accident occurred. Id. The tanker ultimately ran aground,
which tore open the hull and spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William
Sound. Id. After the accident, Hazelwood attempted to rock the tanker off the reef upon
which it had run aground, which could have caused more spillage. Id.
126 Id. at 478. The Coast Guard performed a blood test on Hazelwood almost immediately
after the accident. Id. Exxon also disputed the findings of these tests. Id.
127 Id. at 478–79. The blood alcohol level was based on the amount recorded by the Coast
Guard’s blood alcohol test 11 hours after the spill. Id. at 478. Additionally, witnesses
testified that Hazelwood consumed at least 5 double vodkas before the tanker left port. Id.
at 477.
128 Id. at 478.
52 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:37
program for alcohol addiction.129 Independent of the present action, the accident cost
Exxon billions of dollars in cleanup efforts and civil and criminal liability.130 In the
present action, the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages and $5 bil-
lion in punitive damages.131 The Ninth Circuit reduced the jury’s punitive damage
award to $2.5 billion.132
Exxon Shipping recognized a long-standing tradition in the common law for in-
dividual reasonableness reviews of damage awards.133 Because legislatures cannot
account for variation among individual cases,134 Exxon Shipping rejected any notion
of a mathematical formula for fixing damage awards, regardless of whether such
award constituted compensatory or punitive damages.135 According to the Court,
“there is no ‘standard’ tort . . . injury, making it difficult to settle upon a particular dollar
figure as appropriate across the board.”136 Exxon Shipping held a reasonableness
review of the civil jury’s award under Gore the better framework.137
Exxon Shipping also addressed claims that civil jury awards had become “out-
of-control” or excessive,138 as had long been argued by tort reformists. Scholars like
Professor Deborah Hensler had, for decades, argued that jury awards in personal
injury cases remained relatively stable.139 Professors Neil Vidmar and Jeffery Rice
129 Id. at 476–77. Hazelwood had completed a 28-day alcohol treatment program but
dropped out of the follow-up program, including Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. Id. at
476. According to the evidence at trial, Hazelwood continued drinking after he was released
from a residential treatment program. Id. at 476–77. This drinking allegedly occurred aboard
Exxon tankers and with Exxon officials. Id. Exxon presented no evidence that Hazelwood
had been monitored after his return to duty. Id. at 477.
130 Id. at 479. This included a $125 million settlement for violation of the Clean Water
Act, a $900 million consent decree that resulted from another civil action, and $303 million
in voluntary settlements with private parties. Id.
131 Id. at 480–81.
132 Id. at 481.
133 Id. at 490. The Court rested its authority on its role as the common law court of last
review, albeit one “faced with a perceived defect in a common law remedy.” Id. at 507.
134 Id. at 506 (also discussing the difficulty for a legislature to index an amount for
inflation and revisit that provision whenever there seemed to be a need for further tinkering).
In the Court’s view, the more promising alternative was to leave the effects of inflation to
the jury or judge who assessed the value of actual loss. Id.; see also Baldus et al., supra note
25, at 1169–70.
135 Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 506.
136 Id.; see also id. at 503 (“[J]ustice would surely bar penalties that reasonable people
would think excessive [or arbitrary] for the harm caused in the circumstances.”).
137 Id. at 506.
138 Id. at 497–99.
139 See Hensler, supra note 12, at 486–95 (discussing relative stability of jury awards in
personal injury cases from 1960–1979 and concluding that once difference in the type of case
has been accounted for, juries have properly awarded higher damages based on the serious-
ness of the injury).
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also concluded that juries provide more stable estimates of noneconomic damages
than arbitrators.140 The Court found that overall civil jury damage awards demon-
strated restraint.141 While civil jury awards had grown over time,142 “by most accounts
the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards ha[d] remained less than [1-to-
1].”143 No data substantiated a marked increase in the percentages of awards.144 The
culprit was not the amount of awards, but the unpredictability and inconsistency of
awards.145 In cases of such outliers, the award must meet the due process standard
for reasonableness.146
As a method of tort reform, compensatory damage caps only affect those who
have suffered more damage at the hands of a tortfeasor. Yeazell argued the real aim
of most state law tort reforms was not frivolous lawsuits, but meritorious lawsuits
with “very high damages.”147 Baldus, MacQueen, and Woodworth agree and argue
caps do not address the equitable relationship between the injury and the award.148
Caps also ignore the sufficiency of evidence presented to the jury on compensatory
damages.149 In most states, application of a compensatory damage cap is automatic
and mechanic.150 There is no consideration of the nature of the injury; the degree or
140 See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in
Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883,
884 (1993) (noting that personal injury plaintiffs win only one-third to one-fifth of jury trials).
141 Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497–98 (surveying literature and finding no evidence of
“mass-produced runaway awards” and noting the lack of data to substantiate claims of a “marked
increase[s] in the percentage of cases with punitive awards over the past several decades”).
142 Id. at 497.
143 Id. at 497–98; see also Hensler, supra note 12, at 493 (describing jury awards over
three categories of personal injury cases: routine personal injuries, higher stakes torts, and
mass latent torts).
144 Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 498; see also Hensler, supra note 12, at 491 (noting that
for higher stakes torts, such as medical malpractice cases, the quality of litigation has increased
substantially which may have led to greater success in the courtroom).
145 See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 500 (describing the spread between high and low
individual punitive awards as unacceptable: “the spread is great, and the outlier cases subject
defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding compensatories”); see also
Hensler, supra note 12, at 495 (noting that for medical malpractice cases, the injuries are
more serious and also noting that defendants tend to defend medical malpractice cases more
than routine torts, which Hensler describes as automobile accidents).
146 See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 501 (describing the reasonableness test as the standard
that every award must pass).
147 Yeazell, supra note 10, at 1786 (noting that fewer than 10% of judgments were in
amounts over $1 million).
148 Baldus et al., supra note 25, at 1122 (arguing that caps only address allegedly excessive
awards but not inadequate awards).
149 See Murphy, supra note 9, at 407 (arguing that because caps apply regardless of the
evidence, “the legislature should be viewed as second-guessing jury decisions”).
150 See infra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.
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length of pain, suffering, disfigurement, or mental anguish experienced by the injured
party; or the injured party’s age or other personal characteristics that directly relate
to the length or amount of harm.151 Except in Massachusetts, there is no consider-
ation of whether application of the cap is just or fair to the plaintiff.152 Thus, in all
cap regimes but one, the compensatory damage award fails to redress actual or con-
crete losses even where a party successfully proves that damages exceed the cap.153
Despite the existence of compensatory damage caps as a method of tort reform, the
Court’s punitive damage jurisprudence presumes that compensatory damage awards
fully compensate the plaintiff.154 This false presumption constitutes a fundamental
flaw in the Gore punitive damages analysis, at least in states that mandate capped
compensation.155 The application of a cap does not depend on the facts and circum-
stances of an individual case.156 An impermissible presumption of excessiveness applies
to all awards over the cap.157 Presumably, all awards under the cap are reasonable.158
Exxon Shipping overtly rejected the major assumption justifying the existence
of most caps and cautioned that even if excessiveness existed, capped compensation
schemes constituted an unwise remedy.159 Despite these warnings, states have con-
tinued to impose and uphold caps.160
Next, this Article discusses compensatory damage caps and state constitutional
civil jury trial litigation on this issue. Part II argues that caps fundamentally flaw the
assumptions upon which Gore relies. Part II also demonstrates that capped compen-
sation also caps the Gore punitive damage analysis. The effect of caps on the Gore
punitive damage analysis has been largely ignored by current scholarship examining
Gore, which is surprising considering Gore’s focus on the individual facts of a case.
151 See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
152 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2015).
153 See Yeazell, supra note 10, at 1784 (arguing that the political narrative of tort reform
was a proxy for an unspoken target—civil jury trials); see also Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s
Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the
Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1235–37 (2014)
(discussing shift of power from civil juries to legislatures, which has effectively taken “the
jury completely out of the damages determination”).
154 See 2 AM. LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: REPORTERS’
STUDY 258 (1991) (“[T]he compensatory award in a successful case should be the starting
point in calculating the punitive award.”) (emphasis added).
155 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008) (“[T]he potential relevance of
the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages is indisputable, being a central feature
in our due process analysis.”).
156 See Murphy, supra note 9, at 350.
157 Id. at 347.
158 Id. at 350 (questioning whether a legislature may cap compensatory damages); see also
id. at 382 n.162.
159 Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 502.
160 See infra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.
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II. STATE LAW COMPENSATORY DAMAGE CAPS
Compensatory damages result from an alleged and proven injury.161 More spe-
cifically, compensatory damages are “awarded to a person as compensation, indem-
nity or restitution for harm.”162 When awarded, compensatory damages should be
more or less commensurate with the injury suffered.163 Compensatory damages can
contain both an economic loss and a noneconomic loss component.164 The economic
loss component includes medical expenses, lost earnings, and other objectively veri-
fiable monetary losses.165 The noneconomic loss component includes injuries related
to pain, suffering, mental anguish and other emotional distresses, disfigurement, and
the loss of consortium or capacity to enjoy life.166
Compensatory damages predate the founding and are an American import of
common law origins.167 Robinson v. Harman,168 an English common law case involving
contracts, appears to be the first to articulate the principle of compensatory damages.169
Robinson established that “where a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of con-
tract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect
to damages, as if the contract had been performed.”170 Thus, at its origins compensa-
tory damages were specifically designed to put a party in the same position before
some harm or wrong occurred.
Until recently, an enduring principle was that the amount of compensatory damages
necessarily depended on the specific circumstances of an individual case.171 In the
mid-1970s, some states began imposing mandatory caps against compensatory dam-
ages in certain categories of common law–based tort cases.172 These states argued that
“runaway” civil juries were the cause of a nationwide medical malpractice insurance
161 Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 64 (1876).
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979).
163 Birdsall, 93 U.S. at 64.
164 FISCHER, supra note 19, § 6.5, at 36–37.
165 Id. at 36. Some states also imposed caps on punitive damage awards. See id. at 37.
166 Id. at 36–37.
167 See Jeff B. Allison, First Amendment Claims Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act:
A Mental or Emotional Injury?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (2006).
168 (1848) 1 Ex. 850.
169 See David Campbell, A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution § 39,
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1097–98 (2011) (citing Robinson, 1 Ex. at 855); see also
OXFORD PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW: ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW 1260 (Andrew Burrows ed.,
3d ed. 2013).
170 Campbell, supra note 169, at 1097–98 (quoting Robinson, 1 Ex. at 855).
171 Jill Wieber Lens, Procedural Due Process and Predictable Punitive Damages Awards,
2012 BYU L. REV. 1, 39 (2012).
172 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 13, at 350 (describing California’s passage of a medical
malpractice liability compensatory damage cap in 1975 as occurring during a “tidal wave of
malpractice litigation”).
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crisis.173 Some compensatory damage caps applied broadly to all tort actions.174 Other
caps applied narrowly to wrongful death175 or medical malpractice cases. Addition-
ally, some states applied the cap only against noneconomic damages.176 Other states
173 See generally Barbour, supra note 9. But see James L. Wright & M. Matthew Williams,
Remember the Alamo: The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Doc-
trine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 461 (2004)
(discussing reports by Standard & Poor’s and the Federal National Practitioners Data Bank,
both of which found that the annual amount of medical malpractice payouts remained rela-
tively flat from 1993 to 2002). Additionally, a 2003 study for the United States General
Accounting Office opined that increased medical malpractice premium rates were caused in
part by the failure of insurance companies to increase rates during periods of high investment
return. Id. at 463–64 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-792, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE (2003)); see also Hensler, supra note 12, at 481 (arguing that,
based on data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the National Center for
State Courts, and Institute for Civil Justice, “the total tort caseload has grown very little” in
the years before 1987).
174 See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015) (imposing $250,000 cap against
noneconomic damages); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (West 2007) (imposing
$500,000 cap against noneconomic damages), declared unconstitutional by Best v. Taylor
Mach. Works, 689 N.E. 2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (2014) (imposing
$250,000 to $350,000 cap against noneconomic damages); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 61.2
(West 2015) (imposing $350,000 cap against noneconomic damages); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-39-102 (2012) (imposing $750,000 to $1 million cap against noneconomic damages).
175 See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (2009) (imposing $500,000 noneconomic
damage cap).
176 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.549 (2015) (imposing $250,000 and $400,000 cap);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2015) (imposing $250,000 cap); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-
302 (2015) (imposing $1 million cap against past and future damages and also imposing
$250,000 noneconomic damage cap, which was raised to $350,000 in 2003); FLA. STAT.
§ 766.118 (2011) (imposing $150,000 to $1.5 million cap in cases resulting in injury and
death), declared unconstitutional as applied in wrongful death cases by Estate of McCall v.
United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1(b) (2015) (imposing
$350,000 cap but raised to $700,000 when multiple institutions involved), declared
unconstitutional by Atlantic Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga.
2010); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West 2015) (imposing $650,000 cap
when injury or death results); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2015) (imposing $500,000
cap unless the jury finds the cap would “deprive the plaintiff of just compensation”); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 2013) (imposing $280,000 to $500,000 cap); MO. REV.
STAT. § 538.210 (2015) (imposing $350,000 cap), declared unconstitutional by Watts v.
Cox. Med. Ctr., 576 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2015)
(imposing $250,000 cap); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (2015) (imposing $250,000 to
$2,250,000 cap); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2015) (imposing $350,000 cap); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.19 (2015) (imposing $500,000 cap); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (2015)
(imposing $500,000 cap); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2015) (imposing $250,000
to $1 million cap); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 (2015) (imposing $350,000 cap); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (West 2015) (imposing $250,000 cap but raised to
$500,000 when multiple institutions involved); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410 (West 2015)
(imposing $250,000 to $450,000 cap); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2015) (imposing $250,000
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applied the cap against both economic and noneconomic damages.177 Not all states
imposed limits on recovery in personal injury cases178 and others refused to apply the
cap where injurious acts were reckless, intentional, or illegal.179 A few states prohibit
informing the jury about the cap.180 Only one state, Massachusetts, allows the jury to
ignore the cap if its imposition would be unfair to the plaintiff.181
The application of a compensatory damage cap does not depend on the specific
circumstances of an individual case.182 Moreover, the assertion that caps constitute
a reasonable response to excessive civil jury awards is questionable. Among cap
regimes, what constitutes an “excessive” civil jury award varies widely, approxi-
mately between $250,000 and $3 million.183 The majority of states, like Idaho,
which upheld its cap, and Missouri, which recently struck it down, fix the cap be-
tween $250,000 and $350,000.184 A few caps are fixed between $500,000 and
to $500,000 cap); WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d)(1) (2008) (imposing $350,000 cap), declared
unconstitutional by Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d
440 (Wis. 2005) (no litigation on subsequently enacted $750,000 noneconomic damage cap).
177 See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (West 2015) (imposing $500,000 to $1,125,000 cap where
healthcare provider is liable for $250,000 and remainder paid from compensation fund); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West 2015) (imposing $500,000 cap where healthcare provider
is liable for $100,000 and remainder paid from compensation fund); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-
5-6 (2015) (imposing $600,000 cap when injury or death results; healthcare provider is liable
for $200,000 and remainder paid from compensation fund); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-
11 (2015) (imposing $500,000 cap); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2011) (imposing $3
million cap).
178 States that have not imposed caps on tort damage awards include Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. The District of Columbia also has not imposed a cap.
179 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.549 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 61.2 (West
2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (2012).
180 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (2015); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West
2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2015), declared unconstitutional by Watts v. Cox. Med.
Ctr., 576 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 90-21.19 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-
5-6 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 61.2
(West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (2012); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 401
(arguing that such provisions misinform the jury about the governing law on compensation).
181 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2015).
182 See supra notes 173–77 (discussing general applicability to all tort actions).
183 See infra notes 184–91 and accompanying text.
184 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2015) (imposing $250,000 cap against
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2015)
(imposing $250,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases, which was
raised to $350,000 in 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1(b), (d) (2015) (imposing $350,000
noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases but raised to $700,000 when multiple
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$750,000.185 Washington’s cap, which was also struck down, designated a formula
based on the plaintiff’s age.186 Other states designate a range for their cap,187 but
institutions are involved), declared unconstitutional by Atlantic Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C.
v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015) (imposing
$250,000 noneconomic damage cap in all personal injury cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02
(2015) (imposing $250,000 noneconomic damage cap in all personal injury cases); MO. REV.
STAT. § 538.210 (2015) (imposing $350,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice
cases), declared unconstitutional by Watts v. Cox. Med. Ctr., 576 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2015) (imposing $250,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical
malpractice cases); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (2015) (imposing $250,000 to $2,250,000
noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases), NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2015)
(imposing $350,000 cap); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (2015) (imposing $500,000 non-
economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23 § 61.2 (West 2015)
(imposing $350,000 cap against noneconomic damages in all tort cases); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-32-220 (2015) (imposing $350,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice
cases); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (West 2015) (imposing $250,000
noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases but raised to $500,000 when multiple
institutions are involved); WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d)(1) (2008) (imposing $350,000 non-
economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases), declared unconstitutional by Ferdon
ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 240 (Wis. 2005).
185 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (West 2007) (imposing $500,000 noneconomic
damage cap in all personal injury cases), declared unconstitutional by Lebron v. Gottlieb
Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(1) (West 2015)
(imposing $500,000 total damage cap in medical malpractice cases); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-
A, § 2-804 (2009) (imposing $500,000 noneconomic damage cap in wrongful death cases);
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West 2015) (imposing $650,000 noneconomic
damage cap in medical malpractice cases where injury or death results but providing that this
amount “shall increase by $15,000 on January 1 of each year beginning January 1, 2009”);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2015) (imposing $500,000 noneconomic damage cap in
medical malpractice cases unless the jury determines the cap “would deprive the plaintiff of
just compensation”) (emphasis added); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (2015) (imposing $600,000
damage cap in medical malpractice cases when injury or death results with provision for in-
crease every third year beginning with January 1, 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.19 (2015)
(imposing $500,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases but providing
formula for increase every third year); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (2015) (imposing
$500,000 total damage cap in medical malpractice cases).
186 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (1986) (imposing cap in all personal injury cases),
declared unconstitutional by Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
187 See generally ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.549 (2015) (imposing noneconomic damage cap
between $250,000 and $400,000 in medical malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-
302 (2015) (imposing $1 million cap against past and future damages); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.1483 (West 2013) (imposing $280,000 to $500,000 noneconomic damage cap
in medical malpractice cases); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2015) (imposing
noneconomic damage cap between $250,000 and $1 million in medical malpractice cases);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410 (West 2015) (imposing $250,000 to $450,000 noneconomic
damage cap in medical malpractice cases); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (West 2015)
(imposing $250,000 to $500,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases).
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only a few allow damages above $1 million.188 The broadest cap range is Florida at
$150,000 to $1.5 million.189 At an amount under $2 million, the highest cap range
is Tennessee at $750,000 to $1 million.190 Virginia’s $3 million cap constitutes the
maximum among states, but Virginia also previously capped damages at $750,000.191
A few states provide annual increases to the cap,192 but most do not.
Because the application of a compensatory damage cap is not predicated upon
a finding that a civil jury’s damage award was excessive, whether compensatory
damage caps violate state civil jury rights remains at issue. Yeazell describes the
civil jury as a unique institution.193 This view of the civil jury is reflected in all but
a few state constitutions, as well as the Federal Constitution, which guarantee civil
jury trials in common law cases.194 By far, most state constitutions establish an in-
violate civil jury trial right, as do Washington, Idaho, and Missouri.195 This term is
defined as “free from change or blemish: PURE, UNBROKEN.”196 A few state civil
188 See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2015) (imposing noneconomic damage cap between
$500,000 and $1,125,000 in personal injury cases); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 (2015) (im-
posing $350,000 to $1,050,000 cap in personal injury cases that involve medical malpractice).
189 FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2011) (imposing cap against noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases resulting in personal injury or death), overturned as applied to wrongful
death cases by Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014).
190 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (2012).
191 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2011).
192 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (2007); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-
09 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
21.19 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-410 (West
2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d)(1) (2001).
193 See generally Yeazell, supra note 10, at 1783 (citing Charles W. Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 667–705 (1973)).
194 See Motz v. Jammaron, 676 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Colo. App. 1983) (acknowledging that
the Colorado Constitution does not entitle litigants to a civil jury as a matter of right); Tellis
v. Lincoln Par. Police Jury, 916 So.2d 1248, 1250 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (acknowledging that
the Louisiana Constitution does not guarantee a right to a civil jury).
195 See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 23; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 7; CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1,
para. XI; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 20; KAN.
CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 5; KY. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 4; MISS.
CONST. art. 3, § 31; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 22(a); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 26; NEB. CONST. art.
1, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 3; N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 9; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 12; N.Y.
CONST. art. 1, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. 2,
§ 19; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 17; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 15; S.D. CONST.
art. 6, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 15; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 21;
WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 5. But see COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 23 (only referring to criminal cases).
196 Inviolate, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (Phillip Babcock
Grove ed., 1993).
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jury trial clauses mirror the Seventh Amendment,197 which provides: “In Suits at
common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”198 A few others states,
like Virginia, declare a sacred civil jury trial right.199 Other state civil jury trial
clauses are best described as anomalies.200
Under the Federal Constitution, “[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding
body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in . . . history and jurispru-
dence that any seeming curtailment of the right . . . [is] scrutinized with the utmost
care.”201 Whether this rule applies to state civil jury trial clauses is unclear. Never-
theless, for colonial constitutions that adopt the common law, any change that alters
the common law also alters the state constitution.202 But the common law was flexi-
ble and adaptable to varying conditions.203 The extent of such flexibility and adapt-
ability constitutes a major conflict among states, which is demonstrated by two state
supreme courts that reached opposing decisions in 1989 on the constitutionality of
compensatory damage caps: Virginia, in Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospital,204
and Washington, in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corporation.205
Etheridge and Sofie embody the fluctuating level of scrutiny among state su-
preme courts when examining state civil jury trial rights. In Etheridge a civil jury’s
award of $2,750,000 was reduced pursuant to section 8.01-581.15 of the Virginia
Code.206 At the time, total damages in medical malpractice cases were capped at
197 See generally HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 13; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 14; W. VA. CONST.
art. 3, § 13.
198 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1996) (identifying and discussing the Seventh Amendment’s
Civil Jury Trial and Reexamination Clauses).
199 E.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 20; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 12;
VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
200 See DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“Trial by jury shall be as heretofore.”); ME. CONST. art. 1,
§ 20 (“In all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right
to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced . . . .”);
MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 23 (inviolably preserving civil jury trial right);
N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (preserving civil jury trial right as sacred and inviolate); S.C.
CONST. art. 1, § 14 (“The right of trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate.”). But see LA.
CONST. art. 1, § 16 (referring only to criminal jury trial right).
201 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
202 Id. at 487; see also id. at 490–91 (Stone, J., dissenting) (explaining that encroachments
on the jury trial right that were impermissible in the common law would also be impermis-
sible by the Seventh Amendment).
203 Id. at 487; see also id. at 492 (Stone, J., dissenting) (explaining that the common law
did not prevent development of novel procedures unless such procedures impaired the jury’s
function to decide issues of fact).
204 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
205 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
206 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529. Wilson had already expended more than $300,000 for
care and treatment by the time of trial. Id. These expenditures were expected to last the
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$750,000.207 Richie Wilson, the plaintiff, was a “normal, healthy,” thirty-five-year-
old married woman and mother of three children.208 Wilson underwent surgery to
restore her deteriorating jaw bone.209 The surgeon removed and reshaped long por-
tions of her rib bones and grafted them into her jaw.210 The surgery left Wilson brain
damaged, paralyzed, “confined to a wheelchair, and unable to care for herself or her
children.”211 Her condition was described as permanent.212
The Virginia Supreme Court held section 8.01-581.15 did “nothing more than
establish the outer limits” of recovery.213 Etheridge held legislative actions presump-
tively reasonable unless “plainly repugnant to some provision of the state or Federal
Constitution.”214 In enacting the cap, Virginia’s General Assembly relied on its own
1975 study that demonstrated medical malpractice insurance rates had increased
nationwide more than 1000% since 1960.215 According to Virginia’s report, the
increase resulted from the number and severity of medical malpractice claims.216
Etheridge apparently accepted the claim that a correlation existed between nation-
wide increases in medical malpractice insurance premiums and the availability of
medical malpractice insurance in Virginia.217 Etheridge also accepted the General
Assembly’s conclusion that it had become too expensive to purchase medical
malpractice insurance in Virginia,218 which threatened the availability of medical
remainder of Wilson’s life. Id. (noting life expectancy of 39.9 years). Before the accident,
Wilson earned approximately $10,000 per year as a nurse. Id. Wilson’s economic losses were
alleged to amount to $1.9 million. Id. Virginia’s cap currently sets a damage range of up to
$3 million beginning on or after July 1, 2013. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2015).
207 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 527.
208 Id. at 526.
209 Id.
210 Id. A general surgeon, Dr. Trower, removed Wilson’s ribs. Id. An oral surgeon grafted
the reshaped rib bone into her jaw. Id. The jury found both Dr. Trower and the hospital
negligent and held that such negligence caused Wilson’s injuries. Id.
211 Id. at 527. Wilson’s brain damage severely affected her memory and intelligence. Id.
She also suffered paralysis on her left side. Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 529.
214 Id. at 528 (quoting Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 827, 832 (Va. 1980)). Due
to such deference, all doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of legislative action. Id.
215 Id. at 527–28. The study was prepared by the Virginia State Corporation Commission’s
Bureau of Insurance, which reported that since 1960 medical malpractice insurance rates had
increased nationwide more than 1000%. Id. at 527. This increase was alleged to have resulted
from a rise in the number and severity of medical malpractice claims, of which 90% origi-
nated after 1965. Id.
216 Id. at 527.
217 Id. at 527, 533. The study also concluded that the increase in insurance rates directly
and substantially caused providers to cease providing services in Virginia, which also nega-
tively affected the health, safety, and welfare of state citizens. Id. at 527–28.
218 Id. at 527, 533.
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care services within the state.219 Ultimately, Etheridge afforded great deference to
Virginia’s judgment that its cap should reflect what medical malpractice insurers
were willing to insure (presumably at the time $750,000 for both economic and non-
economic damages).220
Professor Colleen Murphy, who writes extensively on the conflict between
legislative authority and civil jury trial rights, disagrees with Etheridge and warns
that imposition of compensatory damage caps renders the jury’s computation of
compensatory damages illusory.221 Etheridge recognized broad legislative authority
to alter the nature and scope of the civil jury trial right as it existed in the common
law.222 Etheridge briefly examined the scope of the sacred civil jury trial right
contained in Article I, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution.223 Etheridge reasoned
that when Virginia’s Constitution was adopted in 1776,224 twenty years before rati-
fication of the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Clause, the cause of action for
medical malpractice was a legislatively created tort rather than one based on the
common law.225 As such, a Virginian jury’s constitutionally mandated role in medical
malpractice cases was fulfilled once disputed facts were resolved and damages were
assessed (even if the latter was unenforceable).226
Professor Charles McCormick, who authored the 1935 classic Handbook on the
Law of Damages, would perhaps agree with Murphy. McCormick opined that “from
the beginning of trial by jury,” the amount of damages were “a ‘fact’ to be found by
the jur[y].”227 Yet Etheridge maintains that for Virginian medical malpractice actions,
the jury’s fact-finding function only extended to an assessment of damages.228 In
effect, the law could ultimately determine the limits of recovery.229 In this scenario,
Virginia’s cap was only a mere dictation of the “outer limits,” or the ceiling, of a jury’s
award.230 The trial court’s reduction of damages was the mere application of the law
219 Id. at 527–28, 533.
220 Id. at 533. According to the General Assembly, it became increasingly difficult for Vir-
ginian healthcare providers to obtain medical malpractice insurance in excess of $750,000.
Id. at 527. The court accepted this finding without support. Id. at 533.
221 Murphy, supra note 9, at 404 (arguing against the disingenuousness of claiming com-
pensatory damage caps do not change the functioning of the jury and maintaining that caps
“render[ ] the jury’s decision about compensation illusory”).
222 See Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529, 532.
223 Id. at 528–29.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 529.
226 Id. Etheridge acknowledges that the “jury’s fact-finding function extend[ed] to the assess-
ment of damages,” but described damages as a matter of law not fact. Id. (citations omitted).
227 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 24 (1935).
228 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 528–29.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 529.
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to the facts.231 Etheridge also disagreed with Seventh Amendment jurisprudence that
designated the amount of damages in personal injury cases as an issue of fact within
the province of the jury.232
Professor John Langbein has found that in the common law, the link between
trial and jury was so close that there was “no such thing as nonjury trial[s]” whether
by legislative action or otherwise.233 Etheridge designated the “‘case stated’ proce-
dure” the best portrayal of the common law role of the civil jury during the latter
part of the eighteenth century when Virginia’s Constitution was adopted.234 Accord-
ing to Etheridge, the “case stated” procedure allegedly demonstrated that “the com-
mon law never recognized a right to a full recovery in tort,”235 but was designed
specifically for the purpose of “bypass[ing] the jury when only undisputed facts re-
mained.”236 In a trial that resulted in a “case stated,” the civil “jury’s role was reduced
to a mere formality” and was limited to resolving any “factual issues that arose.”237
In such cases, the parties were entitled to a jury’s assessment of damages, but not the
legal effect or enforcement of the jury’s award.238 Etheridge did not discuss common
law procedures in the late eighteenth century that applied when a case presented
disputed issues of fact.239
The Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in Sofie appears to align more closely
with Murphy, McCormack, and Langbein’s views of the nature and scope of the
231 Id. (noting that the trial court applied the cap “after the jury . . . fulfilled its fact-finding
function”).
232 See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (noting that “the extent of the injury
by an assessment of damages” is a question of fact for the jury).
233 John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522, 527 (2012).
234 Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529. The Etheridge Court identified three procedures that
defined the jury’s role: the “case stated,” the “demurrer to the evidence,” and the “special
verdict.” Id. (citing Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80
HARV. L. REV. 289, 319 (1966)).
235 Id. (“[T]he jury trial guarantee secures no rights other than those that existed at com-
mon law.”).
236 Id. (emphasis added). According to Etheridge, “the jury’s sole function was to resolve
disputed facts.” Id. Because Virginia’s jury trial guarantee only applies to disputed facts, the
jury’s role was fulfilled once the facts were ascertained. Id. “[T]he law determine[d] the
rights of the parties.” Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 See generally id. Presumably the case stated procedure did not apply. Instead the dis-
puted issues of fact were resolved by common law juries. Langbein, supra note 233, at 527.
Langbein observes that bench trials, which he defines as “adjudication by the judge sitting
without a jury,” were unknown until later in the nineteenth century, well after 1776 when
Virginia’s Constitution was enacted. Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 361 (describing
the only exception to the common law tradition of “jury-determined compensation” as a situ-
ation where “an action sought a certain sum and judgment for the plaintiff [that] had been
entered by default or demurrer”).
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civil jury trial rights as it existed in the common law.240 Sofie involved a $1,345,833
damage award that was reduced to $316,377.45 pursuant to section 4.56.250 of the
Revised Code of Washington, which capped noneconomic damages in personal
injury and wrongful death cases using a formula based on the plaintiff’s age.241
Austin Sofie was a sixty-seven-year-old married man and career pipe-fitter who
suffered from mesothelioma, the cause of which was asbestos exposure.242 Damages
proven at trial included “extreme pain” and “consuming physical agony” that could
be only temporarily lessened with “morphine cocktails” or hot baths.243 The Sofie
trial judge found the jury’s award reasonable, but reduced it in compliance with
Washington’s cap.244 The Washington Supreme Court ruled section 4.56.250 vio-
lated the inviolate civil jury trial guarantee contained in Article I, section 21 of the
Washington Constitution.245
Sofie began with the same reasoning, but reached a different outcome than
Etheridge. Like Etheridge, Sofie presumed the cap was constitutional.246 Sofie also
recognized the inapplicability of the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Clause.247
Instead, Sofie focused its examination on the civil jury trial right as it existed in the
common law when Washington’s Constitution was adopted in 1889.248 (Virginia’s
constitution was adopted over a century earlier.) This historical “point in time”249
determined the scope of the right to a civil jury under a state’s constitution, as well
as the causes of action to which that right applied.250
240 See Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 716 (Wash. 1989) (noting that the right
to a jury trial at common law “included the determination of damages”).
241 Id. at 712–13. Revised Code of Washington section 4.56.250(2) provided, in part, that
“[i]n no action seeking damages for personal injury or death may a claimant recover a judgment
for noneconomic damage exceeding an amount determined by multiplying 0.43 by the average
annual wage and by the life expectancy of the person incurring noneconomic damages.” Id.
at 713 n.1. The Sofie jury awarded economic damages in the amount of $191,241. Id. at 713.
The jury also awarded noneconomic damages in the amount of $1,154,592. Id. Of this, Mr.
Sofie was awarded $477,200 for pain and suffering and Mrs. Sofie was awarded $677,392
for loss of consortium. Id.
242 Id. at 712–13.
243 Id. at 713.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 712. The Sofie court described the civil jury trial issue as dispositive of the case.
Id. at 715.
246 Id. at 715–16. Sofie categorized the cap as economic legislation, and thus the presumptions
upon which the cap was based needed to survive a reasonableness review. Id. at 715.
247 Id. at 716 (citing Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916);
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876)); see also Wright & Williams, supra note 173, at
482–94 (discussing the “unincorporated” Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Clause).
248 Sofie, 771 P.2d at 716 (citing State ex rel. Goodner v. Speed, 640 P.2d 13 (Wash.
1982); In re Ellern, 160 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1945); State ex rel. Mullen v. Doherty, 47 P. 958
(Wash. 1897)).
249 Id. at 720 (citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935)).
250 Id. at 716.
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Sofie looked further beyond the question of legislative authority than Etheridge.
Sofie held there was no “issue whether the right to a jury attach[ed]” because both
the economic and noneconomic components of compensatory damages were “clearly”
issues of fact.251 Despite its earlier protestations of the inapplicability of the Seventh
Amendment, Sofie looked to interpretations of the federal civil jury trial right for
guidance.252 The Sofie court found that although “newer’ tort theories” were alleged,
the heart of Sofie’s claim was negligence or other misconduct that resulted in per-
sonal injury.253 These types of personal injuries were among those the common law
recognized in 1889.254
Etheridge and Sofie also conflict on whether state civil jury trial rights are resistant
to legislative attempts to alter the civil jury’s role as the fact-finder on compensatory
damages.255 Sofie professed to examine the issue separately, but, as demonstrated,
essentially questioned whether the amount of damages was an issue of fact “within
the jury’s province.”256 Sofie held that the constitutional nature of the right to a civil
jury trial prohibited modifications by legislative action.257 In effect, Washington’s leg-
islature had the authority “to define parameters of a cause of action” and prescribe
factors to determine liability.258 But Washington’s legislature could not “predetermin[e]
the limits of the jury’s fact-finding power[ ]” or preset damages in common law–
based personal injury cases.259 Sofie reasoned that Washington’s cap impermissibly
changed the trial’s outcome from a jury’s determination to a predetermined one by
251 Id. at 718.
252 Id. at 717–18 (discussing Dimick, 293 U.S. at 478, and Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 417 (1987)).
253 Id. at 718–19 (explaining that a “basic cause of action remains” as arising in tort even
if a newer theory of recovery is alleged).
254 Id. at 718.
255 Compare id. at 720 (“Constitutional protections are not directly subject to common law
changes.”), with Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 532 (Va. 1989) (“Broad
legislative authority exists to alter civil jury trial rights as they existed in the common law.”).
The Sofie court reasoned that Etheridge and other state supreme court opinions either failed
to analyze “the jury’s role in the matter” or failed to engage “the historical constitutional
analysis used . . . in construing the right to a jury.” Sofie, 771 P.2d at 723–24.
256 Sofie, 771 P.2d at 721. The jury’s findings on the issue of damages enjoyed a pre-
sumption of validity and could not be altered unless unsupported by the evidence. Id.
257 Id. at 719. Sofie relied primarily on Baker v. Prewitt, 19 P. 149 (Wash. 1888), which
provided “clear evidence that the jury’s fact-finding role included the determination of
damages.” Id. at 716; see also Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Cmty. Hosp., 699 P.2d 1230, 1232
(Wash. 1985) (holding that the amount of damages was an issue within the province of a
properly instructed jury).
258 Sofie, 771 P.2d at 727.
259 Id. Sofie recognized that legislative power to “shape” litigation did not include
the ability to alter constitutional protections. Id. at 719. Caps allowed the jury’s findings to
“go unheeded,” which did not afford sufficient constitutional protection for the right. Id.
at 721.
66 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:37
the legislature.260 This reduced the civil jury trial right to a shadow with no substance.261
To the extent that other procedures allowed modification of the jury’s determination
of damages, exercises of such authority were rare and involved case-by-case determi-
nations of excessiveness.262 Sofie ruled that Washington’s cap imposed compensatory
damages that were unsupported by the evidence and constituted a “legislative attempt
to mandate legal conclusions.”263 To rule otherwise would result in civil juries exist-
ing in form, but having no effect in function.264
After Sofie, state supreme courts more commonly agreed with Etheridge that com-
pensatory damage caps did not violate state civil jury trial rights.265 For example, in
260 Id. at 720. Sofie described this change as a direct infringement on the civil jury trial
right. Id. at 720–21.
261 Id. at 721 (declaring that the Washington “[C]onstitution deals with substance, not
shadows”).
262 Id. at 720–21; see also id. at 724 (comparing cap procedure with remittitur procedure).
263 Id. at 721. Findings of law are “constitutionally within the province of the judiciary,
not [l]egislature[s].” Id.
264 Id. at 724.
265 See, e.g., Zagklara v. Sprague Energy Corp., 919 F. Supp. 2d 163, 165 (D. Me. 2013)
($500,000 cap for noneconomic damages in wrongful death cases was constitutional except
in maritime cases); Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002) ($1 million cap
against noneconomic damages in personal injury cases and $400,000 cap in wrongful death
cases did not infringe on the right to a civil jury trial); Stinnett v. Tam, 198 Cal. App. 4th
1412 (2011) ($250,000 cap against noneconomic damages did not violate state civil jury trial
clause); Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 191–93 (Fla. 1993) (summary conclusion
that $350,000 noneconomic damage cap against medical practitioners for injury or wrongful
death did not violate state civil jury trial clause when party requests arbitration); Kirkland
v. Blaine Cty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000) ($400,000 noneconomic damage cap in
personal injury cases did not violate state civil jury trial clause; no litigation on subsequently
enacted $250,000 cap); Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 2012) ($250,000 cap against
noneconomic damages in personal injury cases did not violate state civil jury trial clause);
Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990) ($250,000 cap against
noneconomic damages in personal injury cases did not violate the state civil jury trial right),
disapproved of by Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d
102 (Md. 1992) ($350,000 cap against noneconomic damages in personal injury cases did
not violate state jury trial right), aff’d by DRD Pool Serv. v. Freed, 5 A.3d 45, 55–57 (Md.
2010) ($650,000 cap approved under state constitution on the basis of stare decisis);
Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) ($280,000 cap against
noneconomic damages—except in cases where the plaintiff was left hemiplegic, paraplegic,
quadriplegic, cognitively disabled, or unable to procreate—did not violate state civil jury trial
clause because state legislature had the right to modify common law rights of actions and
statutory remedies), enforced by Smith v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 419 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005)
(cap did not violate the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause); Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898
(Mo. 1992) ($350,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases did not violate
state civil jury trial clause), overruled by Watts v. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo.
2012) ($350,000 cap violated state civil jury trial clause); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v.
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Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, a claim was originally brought in the
District of Idaho against a doctor and a hospital who provided prenatal care to Sandy
Kirkland and her newborn son Bryce.266 The jury awarded compensation in the
amount of $29.7 million, which included a noneconomic damage award of $18.5
million.267 Idaho’s noneconomic damage cap, which at the time amounted to $400,000,
was applied to the 25% of the award for which the hospital was liable.268 Pursuant
to section 6-1603(4) of the Idaho Code, the cap was not applied to the 75% of the
award for which the doctor was liable.269 This was based on the jury’s finding that
Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., 663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003) ($1.25 million cap against total
damages did not violate state civil jury trial clause); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880
N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007) (cap of $250,000 or “three times the economic damages up to a
maximum of $350,000 or $500,000" did not violate state civil jury trial clause); Knowles ex
rel. Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996) ($500,000 cap against non-
economic damages, unlike $1,000,000 cap against total damages, did not violate state civil
jury trial clause), superseded by statute, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (1997), as recognized
by Peterson ex rel. Peterson v. Burns, 635 N.W.2d 556 (S.D. 2001); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d
135 (Utah 2004) ($250,000 noneconomic damages cap did not violate state civil jury trial
clause); MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 2011) ($250,000 non-
economic damage cap in medical malpractice cases extended to $500,000 for wrongful death
and serious injuries did not violate state civil jury trial right); Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp.,
Inc., 623 N.W.2d 776 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) ($350,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical
malpractice cases did not violate state civil jury trial clause), overruled on other grounds by
Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005)
($350,000 cap violated state constitutional guarantee of equal protection; no litigation on
subsequently enacted $750,000 noneconomic damage cap). But see Atlanta Oculoplastic
Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010) ($350,000 noneconomic damage cap
in medical malpractice cases violated state civil jury trial clause). Compare Lakin v. Senco
Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999) ($500,000 noneconomic damages cap in personal in-
jury cases violated state civil jury trial right), and Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth, 311 P.3d
461 (Or. 2013) (same), with Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789 (Or. 1995) (en banc) ($500,000
noneconomic damage cap in wrongful death case did not violate state civil jury trial clause),
and Hughes v. PeaceHealth, 178 P.3d 225 (Or. 2008) (same). See generally Watson v.
Hortman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (rejecting contention the noneconomic
damage cap imposed after state constitutional amendment violated the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause or the right to access courts); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.
1990) (upholding noneconomic damage cap in wrongful death cases), superseded by statute,
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.002, .021 (West 2015), as recognized in Naumann
v. Lee, No. 03-11-00066, 2012 WL 1149290 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (unreported).
266 4 P.3d 1115, 1115–16 (Idaho 2000). Bryce suffered the primary injuries. Id. at 1116.
267 Id. at 1116–17. Bryce was awarded economic damages in the amount of $11,215,077
and noneconomic damages in the amount of $15,000,000. Id. Mr. and Mrs. Kirkland were
awarded noneconomic damages in the amount of $3,500,000. Id. at 1117.
268 Id. Enforcement of Idaho Code section 6-1603 reduced damages against the hospital
from $3,750,000 to $573,000. Id.
269 Id.; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603(4) (West 2015).
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the doctor was reckless.270 After the verdict, certification was sought in the Idaho
Supreme Court on several issues of state law, including whether the cap violated the in-
violate civil jury trial right contained in Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution.271
Kirkland’s agreement with Etheridge is of note, because the Idaho Legislature
amended section 6-1603 to lower its noneconomic damage cap shortly after the
Kirkland decision.272 Like Etheridge (and Sofie), Kirkland professed to interpret the
scope of Idaho’s civil jury trial right as it existed in the common law at the time Idaho’s
Constitution was adopted, which was in 1890.273 Although by 1871 Idaho generally
recognized the right of the jury to assess and award damages in personal injury cases,274
Idaho’s Legislature had authority to abolish or modify common law rights and
remedies.275 Idaho’s mandate of capped compensation in medical malpractice cases
was described as such a modification.276 Kirkland agreed with Etheridge’s reasoning
270 Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1117.
271 Id.
272 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015) (amending § 6-1603 (1987) by lowering
noneconomic damage cap to $250,000).
273 Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1118. Idaho’s Constitution was adopted over a century after the adop-
tion of Virginia’s sacred civil jury trial right but one year after the adoption of Washington’s
identical inviolate civil jury trial right. See supra notes 224, 248 and accompanying text. The
Kirkland court reasoned that by “employing the phrase ‘shall remain inviolate,’” Idaho’s
framers “must have intended to perpetuate the right as it existed in 1890.” Kirkland, 4 P.3d
at 1118 (quoting State v. Bennion, 730 P.2d 952, 957 (Idaho 1986)).
274 Id.; see also Idaho Dep’t of Law Enf’t ex rel. Cade v. Free, 885 P.2d 381, 386 (Idaho
1994) (because civil forfeiture cases existed at the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted,
the jury trial right attached).
275 Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1118 (“All laws now in force in the territory of Idaho which are not
repugnant to this Constitution shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitation
or be altered or repealed by the legislature” (emphasis added) (citing IDAHO CONST. art. XXI,
§ 2)); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 478 (1935) (finding that it was the duty of
the jury to assess damages); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (requiring “a
jury trial on the merits in those actions analogous to ‘suits at common law’”). The Kirkland
Court could “discern no logical reason why a statutory limitation on a plaintiffs remedy is
any different than other permissible limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to recover in tort.”
Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1119.
276 Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1119 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904 (2000)) (referring to limi-
tation on liability of government entities); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1101 (West 2015) (referring
to limitation on ski area operators); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-209 (West 2015) (referring to
workers compensation laws). Kirkland further analogized three statutes that allowed increases
to a jury’s award and reasoned that the framers of Idaho’s Constitution could not have intended
to prohibit all laws modifying jury awards. Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1119 (citing REV. STAT. OF
IDAHO TERRITORY, 1887, Title VIII, Ch. III, § 1336) (allowing for double damages against
quartz mill owner whose failure to enclose causes another’s livestock to drink unsafe water);
id. (citing REV. STAT. OF IDAHO TERRITORY, 1887, Title VIII, Ch. III, § 4531) (allowing for
treble damages against those who unlawfully remove another’s timber); id. (citing REV.
STAT. OF IDAHO TERRITORY, 1887, Title VIII, Ch. III, § 4533) (allowing for damages
amounting to triple that of actual damages for unlawful or forcible entry). Kirkland did not
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that the scope of the civil jury trial right did not include enforcement of the jury’s
award of damages.277 With little explanation, Kirkland disagreed with Sofie that a
predetermined cap “plays lip service to the form of the jury.”278 Idaho’s Legislature
could predetermine the maximum value of compensatory damages regardless of the
jury’s findings of fact because Idaho did not guarantee enforcement of the jury’s deter-
mination of the value or amount of the injury (at least in medical malpractice cases).279
Despite the initial trend of state supreme court jurisprudence in agreement with
Etheridge, Sofie was recently followed by the Missouri Supreme Court in Watts v.
Cox Medical Center.280 Watts reconsidered the constitutionality of Missouri’s cap
against noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases,281 which had been
originally upheld in Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hospital.282 The Watts jury awarded
$1.45 million in noneconomic damages for injuries to a mother and a newborn that
arose during prenatal care and delivery.283 The trial judge, citing Adams, reduced
noneconomic damages to $350,000 pursuant to section 538.210 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes.284
Like the Virginia, Washington, and Idaho supreme courts, the Missouri Supreme
Court initially focused on the scope of the inviolate civil jury trial right as it existed
distinguish between the above mentioned causes of action and common law actions in tort.
Id. at 1119–20. Nevertheless, Kirkland reasoned that these preratification statutes were
demonstrative of the Idaho Legislature’s power to modify the common law. Id.
277 Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1120. Kirkland reasoned the jury’s fact-finding role was not
diminished because the cap only limited the legal consequences of the jury’s finding. Id.
“Nothing . . . prohibits a plaintiff from presenting [their] full case to the jury and having the
jury determine the facts . . . based on the evidence presented at trial.” Id. Because the jury
was not instructed about the cap, they were “free to make all factual determinations relevant
to the case,” even if such determinations were not enforced. Id.
278 Id. (agreeing with Etheridge that the right to a jury only entitles a party to a jury’s
verdict, not enforcement of the jury’s award).
279 Id. at 1119–20 (maintaining that “[t]he legal consequences and effect of a jury’s verdict
are a matter for the legislature . . . and the courts”). But see Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating
the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 730
(1993) (describing fact-finding as a “qualitative assessment of the facts” and a “determina-
tion of the legal consequences of the facts”). Murphy hypothesized that the United States
Constitution designated fact-finding as within the province of the jury because juries were
the best investigators of the truth. Id. at 746–47.
280 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012).
281 Id. at 635.
282 Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992). Adams held that the
amount of damages was a question of law, not fact, and thus not within the jury’s purview.
Id. at 907. Relying on Etheridge, the Adams court also noted that Missouri’s cap only applied
after the jury completed its constitutional duty—rendering the verdict. Id. In effect, Missouri’s
Legislature had the right to “abrogate a cause of action cognizable under common law com-
pletely” and thus “limit recovery in those causes of action.” Id.
283 Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 635.
284 Id. at 635–36.
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in the common law when Missouri’s Constitution was adopted in 1829,285 fifty years
after the adoption of the Virginia Constitution but before adoption of the Washington
and Idaho Constitutions.286 Watts held that the scope of the common law civil jury’s
fact-finding role included the amount or value of compensatory damages.287 In direct
contradiction to Etheridge, Watts found that from approximately 1607, the English
common law allowed jury awards for both economic and noneconomic damages
arising out of medical negligence.288
Like Sofie, Watts acknowledged that some common law procedures allowed
modification of the jury’s award.289 But unlike Etheridge and Kirkland, Watts recog-
nized that those procedures were rarely authorized.290Missouri retained the common
law’s long standing reluctance to interrupt the jury’s factual findings.291 Compensa-
tory damage caps in tort cases neither existed nor were contemplated by the common
law when Missouri enacted its civil jury clause.292 Watts overruled Adams to the
extent that it misconstrued the nature of the civil jury trial right once it attached.293
The Missouri Legislature lacked authority to abolish or modify state constitutional
285 Id. at 637–38. The scope of Missouri’s civil jury trial right was also “defined by com-
mon law limitations on the amount of a jury’s damage award.” Id. at 638.
286 See VA. CONST. (1776); WASH. CONST. (1878); IDAHO CONST. (1890).
287 Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 639–40 (recognizing the jury’s constitutional task as fact-finding
on both liability and damages).
288 Id. at 638, 640 (explaining that “the amount of noneconomic damages is a fact that
must be determined by a jury” and is protected by the state civil jury trial right). The Watts
court also noted that in the English common law medical negligence was recognized as one
of five types of private wrongs that were brought in courts of law, but not in equity or
admiralty. Id. at 638.
289 Id. at 640–41 (discussing remittitur procedure and the rarity of its use in Missouri for
fear of tampering with the jury’s constitutional role as finder of fact).
290 Id. at 638 (noting that English common law judges granted new trials only in cases in
which the verdict was deemed inconsistent with the evidence).
291 Id. at 639.
292 Id. (stating that “the right to trial by jury was not subject to legislative limits on damages”
in 1820 when Missouri’s Constitution was adopted).
293 Id. at 641–46. According to the Watts court, Adams’s holding that Missouri’s civil jury
trial right did not protect an award of damages suffered from four fundamental flaws. Id. at
642. First, Adams fundamentally misconstrued the nature of the civil jury trial right in that
the determination of damages was one of the most significant constitutional roles performed
by the jury. Id. Second, the unavoidable result of Adams was that the civil jury trial right was
directly subject to legislative limitations, which impermissibly alters constitutional norms.
Id. (stating “a statute may not infringe on a constitutional right; if the two are in conflict, then
it is the statute rather than the constitution that must give way” (citations omitted)). Third,
Adams’s reliance on Tull for the proposition that the civil jury trial right did not extend to
damages was misplaced because the latter concerned civil penalties, not common law damages.
Id. at 643–44. Finally, Adams failed to examine how Missouri’s inviolate civil jury trial right
was distinguishable from Virginia’s civil jury trial right, and thus the Adams court erred in
relying on Etheridge instead of the plain language of the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 644.
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procedures if such procedures reflected common law principles.294 Because the com-
mon law recognized causes of action in tort for medical negligence, the jury trial
right attached to these claims.295 Thus, the jury’s findings on both liability and damages
were “beyond the reach of hostile legislation.”296
The state supreme court split on compensatory damage caps reveals a funda-
mental disagreement about the civil jury’s role to award compensatory damages in
common law cases. Murphy describes this conflict as a larger question concerning
legislative prerogative and jury authority to determine damages.297 The core dispute
among states is the scope of legislative power to alter a civil jury’s determination of
the value of an injury.298
294 See id. at 640 (holding the jury trial right does not remain inviolate if the jury’s award
of damages in accord with the facts of the case are changed).
295 Id. at 638.
296 Id. at 640.
297 Murphy, supra note 9, at 348–49 (framing the issue as whether and to what extent may
“the legislature alter the norm of jury determination of compensation,” and warning that “the
legislature may not interfere with an ‘essential function’ of jury trial” right).
298 After Etheridge and Sofie, state courts also disagreed on whether caps violate other
provisions of state constitutions. Compare Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156,
164 (Ala. 1991) ($400,000 cap against noneconomic damages unconstitutionally burdened
the state right to a trial); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010)
($500,000 cap against noneconomic damages constituted an unconstitutional state legislative
remittitur); Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078–81 (Ill. 1997) ($500,000
cap against noneconomic damages constitutes unconstitutional special legislation and vio-
lated the state separation of powers clause); Brannigan v. Usitalso, 587 A.2d 1232, 1232
(N.H. 1991) ($875,000 noneconomic damage cap violated the state equal protection clause);
Ohio ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1091–1100 (Ohio
1999) ($250,000 to $500,000 sliding scale cap against noneconomic damages violated the
state due process and separation of powers clauses, as well as the one subject rule for state
legislative acts); Woods v. Unity Health Ctr., Inc., 196 P.3d 529, 531 (Okla. 2008) (service
rules in medical malpractice cases was an impermissible special law under the state consti-
tution); Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Wis. 2005)
($350,00 cap violated the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection, but no litigation
on subsequent $750,000 noneconomic damage cap), with Stinnett v. Tam, 198 Cal. App. 4th
1412, 1417 (2011) ($250,000 cap against noneconomic damages did not violate the state
equal protection clause); Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901, 904–06 (Colo.
1993) ($1 million cap against total damages and $300,000 cap against noneconomic damages
neither infringes on a fundamental right nor affects a suspect classification, and cap met
rational basis standard under the state constitution); Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d
189, 190–91 (Fla. 1993) ($500,000 noneconomic damage cap against medical providers and
$1 million noneconomic damage cap against medical practitioners for injury or wrongful
death due to medical negligence do not violate the single subject rule for state legislature acts,
the state nondelegation doctrine, the state right to access to courts, or the equal protection,
substantive due process, or takings clauses of the state constitution), overruled in part by
Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 897 (Fla. 2014) (noneconomic damage
cap in wrongful death cases violated the state equal protection clause); Samsel v. Wheeler
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Transp. Serv., 789 P.2d 541, 557–58 (Kan. 1990) ($250,000 cap against noneconomic
damages did not violate the state constitutional right to reparation for an injury after due
process), disapproved of by Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991); Oliver v. Magnolia
Clinic, 85 So.3d 39, 44–45 (La. 2012) ($500,000 cap against general damages in medical
malpractice cases did not violate the equal protection and adequate remedies provision of the
state constitution); Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So.2d 517, 519–21
(La. 1992) ($500,000 cap against total damages, except future medical expenses, did not
violate the state due process or equal protection clauses); Murphy v. Edmunds, 601 A.2d
102, 116 (Md. 1992) ($350,000 cap against noneconomic damages in personal injury cases
did not violate the state equal protection clause), aff’d by DRD Pool Serv. v. Freed, 5 A.3d
45, 48–50 (Md. 2010) ($500,000 cap constitutional on basis of stare decisis); Schweich v.
Ziegler, 463 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1990) ($400,000 cap against intangible losses does not
violate the state constitutional right to a remedy); Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 848
S.W.2d 898, 905–06 (Mo. 1992) ($350,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice
cases did not violate the state equal protection clause or open courts doctrine), overturned
on other grounds by Watts v. Cox Med. Ctr., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012); Gourley ex rel.
Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., 663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003) ($1.75 million cap
against total damages did not violate principles prohibiting special legislation, the state equal
protection clause, open courts doctrine, or separation of powers doctrine); Fed. Express Corp.
v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1270–71 (D.N.M. 2002) ($600,000 cap against total
damages did not violate the state equal protection clause); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880
N.E.2d 420, 448–49 (Ohio 2007) ($350,000 to $1 million cap did not violate the state right
to a remedy, the open courts doctrine, or the due process or equal protection clauses, nor did
cap violate the state separation of powers doctrine or the single subject rule for state legislative
acts); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 145 (Utah 2004) ($250,000 noneconomic damages vio-
lated neither separation of powers doctrine, open courts doctrine, uniform operation of laws,
nor due process provisions of the state constitution); Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 623 N.W.2d
776, 787–89 (Wis. 2000) ($350,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases
did not violate the state equal protection or due process clauses, nor did cap violate the state
constitutional right to access to courts or the state separation of powers doctrine), overruled
on other grounds by Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin, 701 N.W.2d 440, 454–56 (Wis.
2005); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 880 (W. Va. 1991) ($1
million noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases did not violate the state equal
protection or substantive due process clauses, nor did cap constitute special legislation), aff’d
by Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406, 407–08 (W. Va. 2001) (cap did not violate equal pro-
tection clause or separation of powers doctrine), aff’d by MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715
S.E.2d 405, 409 (W. Va. 2011) ($500,000 cap did not violate separation of powers, equal
protection, special legislation, or special remedies provisions of the state constitution). Some
courts were in disagreement on the constitutionality of caps before Etheridge and Sofie.
Compare Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 835–36 (N.H. 1980) ($250,000 noneconomic
damage cap in medical malpractice cases violated the state equal protection clause), with
Hoffman v. United, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435–37 (9th Cir. 1985) ($250,000 cap against non-
economic damages did not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right and rational basis
standard was proper standard of review); Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665, 682
(Cal. 1985) ($250,000 cap against noneconomic damages do not violate the state due process
or equal protection clauses); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 672 (Neb. 1977)
(defendant failed to rebut the presumption of the cap’s constitutionality). But see Lucas v.
United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 688–92 (Tex. 1988) ($500,000 cap against noneconomic
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The Seventh Amendment adopts the common law view that the amount of
damages is a fact that must be found by the civil jury and that the jury’s award was
fully enforceable.299 Senator Sheldon Whitehouse agrees with this point and argues
that at its core, the civil jury’s function is essentially fact-finding.300 But as the Wash-
ington Supreme Court noted in Sofie, the federal civil jury trial right is unenforceable
against the states.301
The state supreme court split on the civil jury’s role to award compensatory
damages is a curious one. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the
nature and scope of the civil jury right historically included a jury determination of
the amount of damages.302 In St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Com-
pany v. Craft, the Court examined whether a $5,000 award for pain and suffering in
a wrongful death action under a federal statute was excessive.303 The Court acknowl-
edged the common law distinction between the availability of damages in personal
injury and wrongful death cases.304 At common law, the right of action for personal
damages in medical malpractice cases violates open courts provision of the state constitution,
but see subsequent state constitutional amendment allowing for caps). See generally Knowles
ex rel. Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183, 189–92 (S.D. 1996) ($500,000 cap against
noneconomic damages, unlike cap against total damages, did not violate the state open courts
doctrine or due process clause).
299 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476–78 (1935); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
417 (1987); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 348 (describing the Seventh Amendment as
being “lost in the shuffle” of proposed federal tort reform and arguing the federal civil jury
trial right’s preservation of the “role for the jury in deciding matters of compensation” could
pose a barrier to federal caps).
300 Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our Govern-
ment, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1252 (2013) (describing the core Seventh Amendment
civil jury trial function as fact-finding); Murphy, supra note 279, at 726–27 (describing fact-
finding as a “constitutional function of the civil jury” and describing the jury’s purpose as
serving “the ultimate goal of just adjudication”).
301 See Murphy, supra note 279, at 724 (discussing the lack of coherent theory of “jury
authority,” which Murphy defines as “the decisional role that the [United States] Constitution
mandates for the jury once an entitlement to trial by jury has been triggered”). Murphy also
discusses the Court’s lack of guidance on the question of why some issues are exclusively
for the jury, the judge, or subject to some judicial intervention or review after a jury verdict.
Id. at 725–26 (describing jury authority as disjointed and identifying guidelines sentencing
and punitive damages as current evidence of such disjointedness); see also Murphy, supra
note 9, at 351–52 (discussing the civil jury’s role as a check on legislative power and arguing
that legislatures cannot invade the jury’s constitutional authority).
302 See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
303 Id. at 652–54. The federal statute at issue was the employer’s liability act of 1908,
which had been amended in 1910. Id. at 653. A widow and her children filed the action after
the decedent was killed in an automobile accident. Id. at 653–54. The jury awarded $11,000
for the deceased’s postaccident pain and suffering. Id. at 654. The award was reduced to
$5,000. Id.
304 Id. at 655.
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injuries died with the decedent, and the wrongful death of a person often afforded
no basis for recovery of pain and suffering.305 Because the federal statute at issue
provided for such recovery, the Court turned its attention to whether the award for
pain and suffering was excessive.306 On this issue the Court noted that while the
award seemed large, the power, duty, and responsibility to determine damages in-
volved “only a question of fact.”307
Craft signals the Court’s view that one of the civil jury’s primary roles was to
find an appropriate amount that would indemnify the plaintiff for legally recognized
concrete and actual losses.308 Professor Emeritus Dan Dobbs, a prolific scholar on
the law of remedies,309 describes the aim of compensatory damage awards in per-
sonal injury cases as “compensating the victim or making good the losses proxi-
mately resulting from the injury.”310 Dobbs also characterizes both the economic loss
and noneconomic loss components of the compensatory damage award as redress
for an injured party’s losses.311 The redress of such losses historically constitutes a
legal remedy for which a jury is required.312 The jury’s assessment includes the in-
jury itself and the extent of harm or value of the injury.313 Both presented a question
of “historical or predictive fact.”314 According to Dobbs, such facts varied with “the
kind of harm suffered.”315
As discussed in the previous Section, the Court’s recent punitive damage juris-
prudence presumes that compensatory damages fully account for actual and concrete
losses.316 As demonstrated in this Section, this is a false presumption in states that
impose mandatory caps against compensatory damage awards. The Gore punitive
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
308 Id. at 655, 661.
309 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (2d ed. 1993).
310 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.1(1) (discussing requirement that personal injury damages
be proved and calculated at the trial).
311 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); see also DOBBS,
supra note 309, § 1.1 (distinguishing between “damages as compensation” and “noncompen-
satory monetary awards”).
312 DOBBS, supra note 309, § 1.2 (distinguishing between remedies at law and remedies
in equity and discussing requirement of a jury where the remedy is purely legal); see also
Murphy, supra note 9, at 349 (discussing compensatory damages and characterizing the
determination of compensation as being “at the heart of the jury’s constitutional province”).
313 Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; see also Whitehouse, supra note 300, at 1262 (dis-
cussing the broad discretion of the American civil jury “to determine the appropriate amount
of damages”).
314 Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added).
315 DOBBS, supra note 309, § 3.3(1) (explaining the lack of universal measurement of
damages).
316 See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432 (noting that compensatory damages “are intended
to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered”).
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damage analysis includes a comparison of the ratio between punitive and compensa-
tory damages.317 But the Court offers no guidance as to what constitutes the starting
point of Gore’s comparison in cap regimes. The Court has also remained silent on
whether compensatory damage caps critically flaw Gore’s punitive damages analysis.
Part III of this Article considers these fundamental questions.
III. UNCAPPING COMPENSATION IN THE GORE PUNITIVE DAMAGE ANALYSIS
In this part, this Article suggests that the Gore punitive damage analysis is resistant
towards application of compensatory damage caps. Gore presumes that compensa-
tory damages fully account for actual and concrete losses in an individual case.318
Compensatory damage caps do not consider the individual facts and circumstances
of a case. Exxon Shipping reasons that no “standard tort injury” exists.319 Legisla-
tures are unable to account for variation among individual cases because there is no
“particular dollar figure that is appropriate across the board.”320 Exxon Shipping also
rejected the rationale that civil jury awards suffered from systematic excessiveness.321
Instead, unpredictability is of a greater concern (at least with respect to punitive damage
awards, which should only punish a defendant for actual harm to the plaintiff).322
Professor Jill Wieber Lens argues that by necessity compensatory damages in tort
mandate “inconsistency and unpredictability.”323 This Article agrees with Lens that
unpredictability is of a lesser concern with regard to compensatory damages.324
Gore, its predecessors, and its progeny rely on the “reasonable relationship” in
the common law between compensatory and punitive damages.325 Consistent with
common law principles, Gore relies on individualized review of damages and tasks
judges, not legislatures, as the proper check on the civil jury.326 Procedures that im-
pose compensatory damage caps constitute a “one-size-fits-all” approach that lacks
individuality or flexibility.327 The common law does not appear to empower state
317 See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580–83 (1996).
318 See id.
319 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 506 (2007).
320 Id.
321 Id. at 449–500.
322 Id.
323 See Jill Wieber Lens, Punishing for the Injury: Tort Law’s Influence in Defining the
Constitutional Limitations on Punitive Damage Awards, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 630–31
(2014) (arguing”tort law requires personalization to the plaintiff’s injury” and that “to fully
compensate, the damages must focus on the specific plaintiff”).
324 Id. at 634–35 (explaining that there is less concern for predictability and consistency
with regards to civil jury awards in tort cases because tort law’s injury requirement gives way
to the need to personalize damages to specific disputes).
325 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580–81 (1996).
326 Id. at 569–74.
327 See id. at 569–70.
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legislatures with authority to “check” the civil jury328 or otherwise “curb damages.”329
Moreover, legislatively imposed caps neither existed in nor were contemplated by
the common law when most colonial constitutions were enacted.330
The second Gore guidepost establishes compensatory damages as the “baseline”
for analyzing punitive damages.331 Gore prefers “single digit” ratios between puni-
tive and compensatory damages,332 but offers no guidance as to what constitutes the
baseline in cap regimes: the jury’s award of compensatory damages or the capped
award imposed by the legislature. Compensatory damage caps produce a drastic alter-
ation of the balance of power between the parties in civil litigation. Tortious defen-
dants are free to propose settlement offers that are unrelated to the provable amount
of damages.333 But if a case proceeds to trial, a plaintiff is still required to present
credible evidence of the full amount of liability, even though the judgment could
ultimately constitute a fraction of the damages that were proven.334 Cap regimes
impose identical compensation for dissimilar injuries and constitute an unprecedented
abandonment of common law principles. If such procedures are properly applied to
common law torts, what prevents the application of such procedures to common law
cases arising in contract or property?
Compensatory damage caps fundamentally flaw the assumptions upon which
the second Gore guidepost relies.335 Lens argues that both punitive and compensa-
tory damages should be measured with a subjective focus on the plaintiff’s actual
loss.336 The second Gore guidepost focuses on the individual facts of a case,337 but
compensatory damage caps do not. In cap regimes, some categories of provable
injuries are left undercompensated. Less tortious defendants pay full value for the
328 See Thomas, supra note 153, at 1229.
329 Id. (arguing that no such role existed for common law legislatures and concluding that
“[u]ltimately, only a jury could decide damages subject to the new trial possibility”).
330 Watts v. Cox Med. Ctr., 376 S.W.3d 633, 641–46 (Mo. 2012); see also Murphy, supra
note 9, at 398–99 (discussing the “strong historical link between assessment of compensatory
damages and the right to a civil jury trial”).
331 Lens, supra note 323, at 633–34 (explaining that punitive damages are “pegged” to the
amount of compensatory damages because “the injury for which the defendant is liable in
tort . . . is the baseline for [punitive] damages”).
332 State Farm Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (identifying single-digit
multipliers as sufficient to achieve the goals of punitive damages).
333 See generally Sharkey, supra note 8 (discussing the impact of caps on settlement
negotiations).
334 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 565–66 (1996).
335 Murphy, supra note 9, at 407–10 (hypothesizing that the real purpose of cap legislation
appears to be the limitation of jury decisions, which is a purpose in tension with the civil jury
trial right of the Seventh Amendment).
336 Lens, supra note 323, at 623–26 (discussing tort law’s injury requirement as mandating
that compensatory and punitive damages be based on the injury and nothing else).
337 See id. at 609.
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injuries they inflict, while more tortious defendants do not.338 Surely the criminal
justice system would suffer if those convicted of misdemeanors face the same punish-
ment as those convicted of violent felonies. A civil justice system that awards com-
pensation without regard to the severity of the injury suffers in the same manner.339
Compensatory damage caps arbitrarily cap the second Gore guidepost. State
legislatures are allowed to innovate. But as Professor Renée Lettow Lerner argues,
juries were designed to protect against “arbitrary or capricious interference of the
government.”340 Compensatory damage caps interfere with the civil jury’s constitu-
tionally proscribed role to “find” the amount of damages.341 In a hypothetical cap
regime where compensatory damages are limited to $250,000, a reasonable punitive
damage award under Gore would necessarily fall between $250,000 and $2.5 mil-
lion if the capped award constituted the starting point for the second Gore guidepost.
Yet, the hypothetical jury may have awarded actual and concrete loss in an amount
that exceeds the higher end of Gore’s presumptively reasonable range for punitive
damages. In this respect, this Article agrees with Dobbs’s description of compensa-
tory damage caps as a “crude” means of controlling excessiveness.342
Several theories exist to uncap the Gore punitive damages analysis. First, a
capped award should be rejected where procedures do not allow trial judges the
opportunity to review the civil jury’s original award for reasonableness (or if the
trial judge has had such opportunity and confirms an award that exceeds the cap).343
Second, a capped award should be rejected if the civil jury has not been informed
of the existence of a compensatory damage cap (or if the jury has been so informed
and still returns an award that exceeds the cap).344 Finally, a capped award should
338 See id. at 631–32 (arguing that consistency in compensatory damage awards in tort law
would be inappropriate because of the need to fully compensate the plaintiff and warning that
if the “jury’s role in awarding . . . compensatory damages is replaced with some objective
measure, some plaintiffs will not receive full compensation for their injuries”); see also
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 506 (2007) (noting that because “there are no
punitive damages guidelines . . . the specific amount of punitive-damages . . . will be arbitrary”
(quoting Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003))).
339 Lens, supra note 323, at 623–26; see also Barry Meier & Hilary Stout, Victims of G.M.
Deadly Defect Fall Through Legal Cracks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/12/30/business/victims-of-gm-deadly-defect-fall-through-legal-cracks.html [http://
perma.cc/KMS9-GVVZ] (reporting that the existence of damage caps, among other factors,
make it difficult to bring to light product defects and reporting that victims of product defects of-
ten have difficulty finding legal counsel unless the victims can “finance[ ] the case themselves”).
340 Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights
to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 833 (2014).
341 See Lens, supra note 323, at 623–26.
342 See generally DOBBS, supra note 309, § 8.1(4) & § 8.8 (discussing statutory caps on
damages).
343 See infra Part III.A; see also Lens, supra note 323, at 623–26.
344 See infra Part III.B; see also Sharkey, supra note 8, at 425–28.
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be rejected where the civil jury has no opportunity to reconsider or confirm an award
that exceeds the cap (or where the jury has had such opportunity and actually af-
firmed an award that exceeds the cap).345 Each theory is discussed in turn.
A. Theory 1
The first rationale for uncapping compensation in the Gore punitive damage
analysis is the failure to empower the trial judge, before application of a cap, with
traditional common law authority to order a new trial if a civil jury’s award is ex-
cessively high or arbitrarily low.346 The civil jury trial right is and always has been
held in “jealous regard” by the American people,347 who adopted the common law
view that the jury was an “indispensable element” of judicial administration.348 In
England and in the colonial United States the jury was “generally regarded as the
normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact” in civil cases.349 Al-
though most state constitutions are not explicit as to the exact nature and scope of
the civil jury trial right, most states agree that the English common law forms the
interpretive basis once the right to a jury has attached to a particular cause of
action.350 In the common law and in colonial practice the power of the court and the 
345 See infra Part III.C.
346 Dimick v. Schiedt, 239 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (noting that where the verdict is “palpably
and grossly inadequate or excessive . . . both parties remain entitled, as they were entitled in
the first instance, to have a jury properly determine the question[s] of liability and . . .
damages”); Baldus, supra note 25, at 1127–30 (discussing the common law practice of
additur and remittitur review).
347 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 478; see also Thomas, supra note 153, at 1232 (“The English
viewed the jury as a protector against the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature. The
American jury was established largely according to this model.”).
348 Whitehouse, supra note 300, at 1243 (explaining that American juries have been long
tasked with performing a historically pedigreed service of political libertarianism, specifically
that of adjudicator of factual disputes in common law cases). In this sense, the jury is a
structural element of American government that confers political importance. Id. at 1243–44.
349 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 485–86. Senator Whitehouse described the historical under-
standing of the civil jury as “an institutional check” upon and an independent element of
government. Whitehouse, supra note 300, at 1244.
350 See, e.g., In re One Chevrolet Auto. Senior v. State, 87 So. 592, 592 (Ala. 1921)
(noting that the preservation of the right to a civil jury does not extend to “causes unknown
to the common law”); Frank v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 748 P.2d 752, 754 (Alaska 1988)
(citing ALASKA CONST. Art. I, § 16) (preserving the right to a civil jury to the “same extent
as it existed at common law”); In re Estate of Newman, 196 P.3d 863, 875 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008) (preserving a right to a civil jury “only in cases where it would have existed under the
common law”); Jones v. Reed, 590 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Ark. 1979) (extending the right to a civil
jury “only to common law actions”); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 252 P.3d 450, 452
(Cal. 2011) (limiting right to a civil jury only “as it existed at common law”); Swanson v.
Boschen, 120 A.2d 546, 549 (Conn. 1956) (recognizing right to a civil jury as extending only
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to actions that were “of the same nature” as those that existed prior to 1818); Claudio v.
State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1296 (Del. 1991) (discussing constitutional commitment to a civil jury
only “as it existed at common law”); In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433,
435 (Fla. 1986) (referring to the common law with regards to the right to a civil jury);
Strange v. Strange, 148 S.E.2d 494, 495 (Ga. 1966) (guaranteeing the continuance of the
right to a civil jury only as it existed at common law); Hous. Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Ferguson,
979 P.2d 1107, 1114 (Haw. 1999) (referring to the common law in interpreting the scope of
the right to a civil jury); Kirkland v. Blaine Cty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1118 (Idaho 2000)
(preserving the right to a civil jury as it existed in the common law); In re Estate of Grabow,
392 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (excluding causes of actions unknown to common
law from the scope of the civil jury trial right); Sims v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 782
N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ind. 2003) (finding prohibition against trial by civil jury reasonable where
cause of action was not recognized by the common law); Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. v. Mitchell, 305
N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 1981) (noting that the constitutional right to a civil jury carries with
it common law concepts); Waggener v. Seever Sys., 664 P.2d 813, 817 (Kan. 1983) (noting
that the question of whether the right to a civil jury applies is determinable on the basis of the
common law); Daniels v. CDB Bell, LLC, 300 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Ky. 2009) (referring to the
common law with regards to the right to a civil jury); State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703, 709 (Me.
1983) (same); Davis v. Slater, 861 A.2d 78, 86–87 (Md. 2004) (holding “the common law
. . . includes the law governing the entitlement to demand” a civil jury); Stonehill Coll. v.
Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 226 (Mass. 2004) (referring to the
common law right to a civil jury); State Conservation Dep’t v. Brown, 55 N.W.2d 859, 861
(Mich. 1952) (same); Onvoy, Inc. v. Allete, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn. 2007) (referring
to the common law with regards to the right to a civil jury); Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co.
v. McLeod Lumber Co., 113 So. 433, 437–38 (Miss. 1927) (describing the right to a civil
jury as deriving from the common law); State v. ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82,
86–89 (Mo. 2003) (referring to the common law to determine the scope of the right to a civil
jury); In re M.H., 143 P.3d 103, 106 (Mont. 2006) (rejecting applicability of the civil jury
because at common law such right did not exist for the proceedings at issue); Nebraska ex
rel. Cherry v. Burns, 602 N.W.2d 477, 482 (Neb. 1999) (preserving the right to a civil jury
as it existed at common law); Cheung v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 124
P.3d 550, 557 (Nev. 2005) (same); Hair Excitement, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 965 A.2d
1032, 1037 (N.H. 2009) (same); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 59 A.3d
561, 568 (N.J. 2013) (noting the right to a civil jury applies only where the right existed at
common law); Bd. of Educ. of Carlsbad Schs. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511, 522 (N.M. 1994)
(explaining that litigants only have the right to a civil jury if it existed at common law);
Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 527 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (describing the
common law as the underlying determinant of whether the right to a civil jury applied); N.C.
State Bar v. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89, 93 (N.C. 1982) (noting that where prerogative existed
at common law, right to a civil jury applied); North Dakota v. 17,515.00 in Cash Money, 670
N.W.2d 826, 827 (N.D. 2003) (noting that where a demand could be made as a matter of
right at common law, the civil jury right applied); Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs.,
927 N.E.2d 1092, 1105 (Ohio 2010) (referring to the common law to determine the scope of
the right to a civil jury); State ex rel. Dugger v. Twelve Thousand Dollars, 155 P.3d 858, 864
(Okla. Ct. App. 2007) (describing that the right to a civil jury as dependent upon existence
of the right at common law); Jensen v. Whitlow, 51 P.3d 599, 604 (Or. 2002) (guaranteeing
a civil jury only as it existed at common law); Commonwealth v. One (1) 1984 Z-28 Camaro
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power of the jury were distinguished by findings of law, which were determined by
the former, and findings of fact, which were determined by the latter.351
In the common law, a civil jury’s damage award was “entitled to a strong pre-
sumption of validity,”352 but even in the common law inadequate or excessive civil
jury awards were not allowed to stand.353 If “the verdict was excessive or trifling, the
remedy was to submit the case to . . . another jury.”354Although authority to increase
or decrease damages existed,355 little evidence suggested that common law courts
Coupe, 610 A.2d 36, 40 (Penn. 1992) (referring to the common law to determine the scope
of the right to a civil jury); Bendick v. Cambio, 558 A.2d 941, 945 (R.I. 1989) (same); C.W.
Matthews Contracting Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 230 S.E.2d 223, 226 (S.C. 1976) (same);
State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 805 (S.D. 2006) (extending scope of civil jury trial right
only to causes of action that existed at common law); Helms v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 987
S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1999) (same); State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d
288, 291–92 (Tex. 1975) (noting the right to a civil jury exists where it would have at common
law); Buck v. Robinson, 177 P.3d 648, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (referring to the common
law to determine the scope of the right to a civil jury); State v. Irving Oil Corp., 955 A.2d
1098, 1100–01 (Vt. 2008) (same); Ingram v. Commonwealth, 741 S.E.2d 62, 68 (Va. Ct.
App. 2013) (denying civil jury because cause of action unknown to common law); Quesnell
v. Washington, 517 P.2d 568, 579 (Wash. 1973) (referring to the common law to determine
the scope of the right to a civil jury); W. Va. Road Comm’n v. Boggess, 126 S.E.2d 26, 28–
29 (W.Va. 1962) (same); State v. Abbott Labs., 816 N.W.2d 145, 156 (Wisc. 2012) (same);
In re Estate of Cheek, 53 P.3d 113, 116–17 (Wyo. 2002) (denying civil jury because not
given at common law); see also Whitehouse, supra note 300, at 1250–52 (commenting on
the Founders’s differing views that the number and differing forms of civil jury trial clauses
either made inclusion of any one impractical for federal constitutional law purposes or posed
no risk because the popularity of the clause made objection to it odious to the extent of being
hated). But see Motz v. Jammaron, 676 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding no
entitlement to a civil jury as a matter of right); Tellis v. Lincoln Par. Police Jury, 916 So.2d
1248, 1250 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that because state constitution does not guarantee a
right to a civil jury, the applicability of the right must be determined by looking to state
statutory law).
351 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486.
352 TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993).
353 See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486. The Dimick Court describes the jury trial right as being
of ancient origin, but notes that the right is limited to a jury that acts properly. Id. at 485–86;
see also Murphy, supra note 279, at 745–46 (1993) (discussing the Founders’s perception that
juries were not infallible and describing a new trial as the cure for jury error).
354 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 478. In cases where the plaintiff asks for a new trial because
damages are too small, the court lacks authority to order an increase without consent. Id. at
480. In turn where the defendant asks for a new trial because damages were excessive, “the
[c]ourt has no power to reduce the damages to a reasonable sum instead of ordering a new
trial.” Id.; see also Baldus, supra note 25, at 1127–30 (discussing the common law practice
of additur and remittitur review).
355 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486. The court’s authority to interfere with the verdict depended
upon the assent of both parties. Id. at 481.
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often acted upon or exercised that authority.356 For colonial courts, the exercise of
such authority was confined to courts sitting en banc,357 but modern procedures have
expanded such power to trial courts. There is no evidence that the common law au-
thorized an automatic cap in an amount set by a legislative body. Moreover, current cap
legislation does not require an affirmative finding of excessiveness or arbitrariness
before damages are reduced.358
This Article suggests that the Gore punitive damage analysis should be un-
capped where trial judges are not empowered to determine whether a jury’s award
of compensation is excessive. The Gore punitive damage analysis should also be
uncapped if the trial judge has had such opportunity and confirms an award that
exceeds the cap. Where cap regimes empower trial judges with such authority, the
following factors for considering whether a civil jury’s compensatory damage award
is excessive should apply: (1) the severity of the harm; (2) the length of time during
which the injury will exist; and (3) the disparity between the awards of economic
and noneconomic damages. In analyzing the severity and length of the injury, trial
judges should also consider the following subfactors: (a) the degree of physical and
emotional harm caused by the injury; (b) whether the harm will likely increase or
decrease over time; (c) whether the harm caused the plaintiff to become physically
or financially vulnerable; (d) whether the harm caused the plaintiff to exist in a
vegetative state; and (e) whether the harm caused permanent disability, disfigure-
ment, blindness, loss of a limb, paralysis, and cognitive disabilities or other trauma.
These factors are intended as a starting point. Courts should be free to consider other
factors that focus on the individualized facts and circumstances of a case.359
B. Theory 2
The second rationale for uncapping compensation in the Gore punitive damage
analysis is the failure to instruct a jury about the existence of the cap before its ap-
plication. “The ability of the jury to tailor its decision to the facts and circumstances
of a particular case . . . is not a vice, but a virtue.”360 Unlike a legislatively imposed
cap, the Gore punitive damage analysis does not disregard the civil jury trial right.
Instead, Gore balances the right with the necessity of avoiding procedures that
unnecessarily deprive a jury of proper legal guidance.361 Historically, compensatory
356 Id. The Dimick Court’s analysis revealed that 1733 was the last known exercise of such
authority in the English common law. Id. at 477 (citing Burton v. Baynes, Barnes Practice
Cases 153 (1733)). According to the Court, the practice of granting new trials did not come
into operation until a later date. Id.
357 Id. At the time of ratification, this practice was obsolete in England. Id.
358 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West 2015).
359 See Baldus, supra note 25, at 1122–23; Murphy, supra note 279, at 734–35.
360 Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 79, 89 (2005).
361 Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007).
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damages have been specifically designed to put a party in the same position before
some harm or wrong occurred.362 By necessity, this requires consideration of the spe-
cific circumstances of the individual case,363 which capped compensation schemes
fail to do.
In many respects, the factual underpinnings justifying compensatory damage
caps are shrouded in mystery. The legislative history accompanying most cap legis-
lation does not include evidence of systemic and wide-spread excessiveness. Exxon
Shipping found that overall civil jury damage awards demonstrated restraint.364 A
plurality of the Florida Supreme Court appeared to agree with Exxon Shipping in
Estate of McCall v. United States.365 The McCall plurality maintained that legislative
findings were not to be accepted “at face value,”366 noted the lack of specific leg-
islative findings to support claims of excessive civil jury awards in Florida,367 and
362 Lens, supra note 171, at 39.
363 Id.
364 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497–98 (2007) (surveying literature and
finding no evidence of “mass-produced runaway awards” and noting the lack of data to sub-
stantiate claims of “marked increase[s] in the percentage of cases with punitive awards over
the past several decades”).
365 134 So. 3d 894, 910 (Fla. 2014). McCall was decided on equal protection grounds and
only as the cap applied to wrongful death cases. Id. at 915. The claims in McCall arose out
of prenatal and delivery care that resulted in the death of the mother after birth. Id. at 897–99.
Michelle McCall received care at a United States Air Force clinic’s family practice depart-
ment during her third trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 897. Blood pressure tests revealed that
McCall suffered from preeclampsia. Id. McCall’s condition required labor to be immediately
induced. Id. An Air Force obstetrician was requested, but none were available. Id. at 898.
Thus, family practice doctors transferred McCall to another facility and attempted to induce
labor. Id. By the time an obstetrician arrived, it was several hours later and McCall had already
vaginally delivered a healthy baby boy. Id. Nevertheless, the obstetrician was required to
deliver the placenta, which the family practice doctors were unable to do. Id. By this time,
McCall’s blood pressure dropped to a dangerously low level. Id. Unfortunately, the obstetrician
who delivered the placenta was not aware of McCall’s dangerous condition. Id. For an un-
known length of time after the second delivery, McCall laid in shock and ultimately went into
cardiac arrest. Id. at 899. She would never regain consciousness and was removed from life
support four days after the birth of her son. Id. The civil jury awarded noneconomic damages
in the amount of $2 million, which were reduced to $1 million. Id. This amount included
$500,000 for McCall’s son and $750,000 for each of her parents. Id.
366 Id. at 906. While not accepted at face value, legislative findings are presumptively
correct. Id. Nevertheless, such findings are always subject to judicial inquiry as to whether
they are actually factual. Id. (noting that courts may defer to legislative findings, but “even
then courts must conduct their own inquiry”); see also Murphy, supra note 279, at 728–29
(identifying the jury trial right as a protectant against “abuses of official power” and
describing the jury as a “one-time actor” independent from government influences or the
judicial system).
367 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914, 916. On certification from the Eleventh Circuit, McCall
considered whether section 766.118 of the Florida Statutes violated the right to equal pro-
tection contained in Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 897, 900. Another
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held Florida’s cap lacked a reasonable relationship to addressing the effects of a medical
malpractice crisis.368 Only anecdotal and inaccurate evidence of physician departures
in Florida had been presented.369 In fact, the number of doctors licensed to practice
in Florida increased in the five years prior to enactment of the cap.370 No credible
evidence suggested that patients in Florida were denied or had been directed some-
place else for medical care.371 Nor were there large increases in frivolous lawsuits.372
Empirical evidence on the correlation between compensatory damage caps and
malpractice premiums is difficult to reconcile.373 In Florida, the “so-called” medical
malpractice crisis was nothing more than an “underwriting cycle,”374 which had
certified question from the Eleventh Circuit involved whether section 766.118 violated the
inviolate civil jury trial right contained in Article I, section 22 of the Florida Constitution,
which became effective in 1845 (after both the Virginia and Missouri Constitutions but
before the Washington and Idaho Constitutions). Id. at 897, 915. McCall acknowledged that
at common law, Florida did not recognize a cause of action for wrongful death and thus the
civil jury trial right did not apply. Id. at 915. But McCall noted that the cap applied to
medical malpractice actions resulting in wrongful death and personal injury, the latter which
“previously existed under the common law.” Id. The McCall plurality declined to determine
the caps constitutionality as it applied to common law based personal injury cases, noting
that to do so would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. Id.
368 Id. at 901. The McCall plurality described the cap as imposing arbitrary distinctions.
Id. at 901–03. Moreover, the cap imposed a devastating cost on a few for the purpose of
saving a modest amount for many. Id. at 903. According to the McCall plurality, section
766.118 improperly burdened “those who are most grievously injured” and “those who
sustain the greatest damage and loss.” Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 279, at 727–28
(describing rationality as one of the ultimate goals of just adjudication).
369 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 909. No credible evidence correlated high malpractice premiums
with any specific physician’s departure. Id.
370 Id. The United States General Accounting Office found that from 1991 to 2001,
Florida’s physician supply per 100,000 people grew 10.7% in metropolitan areas and 19%
in nonmetropolitan areas. Id. at 906.
371 Id. at 908.
372 Id. In Florida, only 7.5% of cases that resulted in payments of $1 million or more over
a 14-year period involved a jury verdict. Id. at 907 (citing Neil Vidmar et al., Million Dollar
Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post-Verdict and Pre-Suit Settlements, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1343, 1345–46 (2006)). Almost an equal percentage of cases that involved payment of
$1 million or more were resolved without any legal action ever being filed. Id. Thus in
Florida, jury trials constitute only a very small portion of medical malpractice payments. Id.
373 See Wright & Williams, supra note 173, at 463. But see Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort
Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 905, 925 (2008) (discussing a 1998 study that showed 6% to 8% lower growth in
malpractice premiums in cap regimes) (citations omitted).
374 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 907. The McCall plurality found that authoritative government
reports completely undermined the existence of a medical malpractice crisis. Id. at 906. Nor
was there credible evidence that tort reform flattened insurance rates. Id. at 908 (identifying
cause of flattening rates as “modulations in the insurance cycle”) (citations omitted); see also
id. at 910 (discussing legislative testimony that a “$500,000 cap against noneconomic
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always occurred in the medical malpractice insurance industry.375 Additionally, the
median medical malpractice premium paid by physicians practicing in high-risk
specialties (internal medicine, obstetrics/gynecology, and general surgery) rose by
48.2% in states with noneconomic damage caps.376 This compared to 35.9% in states
without caps.377 Only 10.5% of states experienced static or declining medical malprac-
tice premium rates following the imposition of a cap.378 States without caps experi-
enced 18.7% static or declining medical malpractice premium rates.379 In Florida, like
in most states, insurance companies were not required to pass the savings attributed
from the cap onto providers.380 Instead those savings constituted a windfall.381 Shock-
ingly, Floridian insurers continued to request rate increases despite more than a
4300% surge in net income following imposition of the cap.382
Exxon Shipping denied a necessity to curb or check civil juries because of ex-
cessive awards.383 Perhaps more states are beginning to agree. Since the millennium,
the national tort reform debate has shifted to whether a medical malpractice crisis
ever existed.384 To the extent that a crisis did exist, current data may also show it has
damages would achieve ‘virtually nothing’ with regards to stabilizing medical malpractice
insurance rates”) (citations omitted).
375 Id. at 908 (citations omitted) (rejecting civil jury awards as the cause of the two most recent
medical liability insurance crises, but rather “dramatic increases in the amount of money that
the insurance industry put in reserve for claims” after years of leaving claims underreserved).
376 Id. at 910 (citation omitted).
377 Id.; see also Wright Williams, supra note 173, at 463. But see Shepherd, supra note
373, at 925 (discussing a 2004 study showing that in cap regimes, medical malpractice
premiums were 17.1% lower).
378 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 910. This amounted to 2 of 19 states with caps. Id.; see also
Wright & Williams, supra note 173, at 463.
379 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 910. This amounted to 6 of 32 states without caps. Id. (citation
omitted); see also Wright & Williams, supra note 173, at 463.
380 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 911; see also Wright & Williams, supra note 173, at 464.
381 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 911; see also Wright & Williams, supra note 173, at 462 (discussing
national studies that showed “rates do not decline with the passage of damage caps” and
discussing considerable insurance company profits in states where caps have been enacted).
382 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914. The McCall plurality concluded that even if a medical mal-
practice crisis existed, it was not a permanent condition. Id. at 913. Thus, it was unnecessary
to punish the most seriously injured plaintiffs by limiting their noneconomic recovery to a
fixed, arbitrary amount. Id. at 914–15 (noting that healthcare policy cannot be supported
when an improper burden is placed “upon the shoulders of the persons and families who have
been most severely injured and died as a result of medical negligence”).
383 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497–99 (2007); see also Hensler, supra
note 12, at 493 (describing jury awards over three categories of personal injury cases: routine
personal injuries, higher-stakes torts, and mass latent injury torts; also warning that looking
at the overall system of tort litigation ignores the difference in the components across the
three categories).
384 See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497–99.
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subsided.385 A 2004 CBO study found that fewer than two percent of patients who
were the victims of medical error actually brought a lawsuit.386 Based on research
from the states, the primary effects of tort reform were increased profitability for
insurers and reduced recovery for plaintiffs.387 Missouri found that its tort reform
was likely to have disproportionately burdened classes of plaintiffs who were among
those least likely to have the means to pay the upfront costs of bringing a colorable
claim for personal injury.388 In Missouri, like in Florida, this included the young, the
economically disadvantaged, and those who were most severely injured.389
This Article suggests that the Gore punitive damage analysis should be un-
capped if a civil jury has not been informed of the existence of a compensatory
damage cap. The Gore punitive damage analysis should also be uncapped if the jury
has been informed of the cap, but still returns an award that exceeds the cap. A jury
should be properly informed about the law, but some states prohibit informing the
jury about the existence of the cap.390 It is unclear whether the jury is warned about
the existence of the cap in those states that do not expressly prohibit the trial judge
from doing so. This Article does not argue that a jury should be informed of the
amount of the cap, but merely of its existence.
This Article proposes the following jury instruction on the existence of a com-
pensatory damage cap for those states that either prohibit or fail to inform the jury
of the cap’s existence:
Members of the Jury:
This instruction is given as a guide for calculating the amount of compensa-
tory damages if you find that the plaintiff is entitled to them. If you decide
385 McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914; see also Yeazell, supra note 10, at 1789 (“No one who has
studied health care believes that malpractice litigation makes a major contribution to health
costs . . . .”).
386 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES
18 (2004).
387 Id. at x, 12.
388 Jeffrey Herman, Missouri Tort Reform and Medical Malpractice, COVER MISSOURI,
Spring 2012, at 11.
389 Id.; see also McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906 (rejecting contention that noneconomic damage
awards were a key factor behind the alleged unavailable and unaffordable medical mal-
practice insurance in Florida); Baldus, supra note 25, at 1122–23 (arguing that caps cannot
be morally justified); Whitehouse, supra note 300, at 1271 (“When you are alone . . . the
hard square corners of the jury box stand firm against the tide of influence and money.”).
390 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (2015); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West
2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2015), declared unconstitutional by Watts v. Cox. Med.
Ctr., 576 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN.
1978 § 41-5-6 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West 2015); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-42-02 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2323.43 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23 § 61.2 (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West 2012).
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that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover compensatory damages, then you
are instructed to disregard this instruction.
If you decide that the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages
because the defendant caused the plaintiff harm, you must decide how much
money will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for that harm.
There are two kinds of compensatory damages: economic and noneconomic
damages.
Economic damages are the amount of money that will fairly and adequately
compensate the plaintiff for measurable losses of money or property caused
by the defendant. In determining the plaintiff’s economic loss, you may con-
sider objectively verifiable monetary losses including medical expenses, loss
of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replace-
ment, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and
loss of business or employment opportunities.
Noneconomic damages are amounts to compensate the plaintiff for past or
future physical pain or mental suffering, including the loss of enjoyment of
life, disfigurement, physical impairment, inconvenience, grief, anxiety,
humiliation, emotional distress, and other damages where applicable. No
fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of noneconomic damages.
In determining the plaintiff’s noneconomic loss, you may consider:
1. The severity of the harm;
2. The length of time during which the injury will exist; and
3. The disparity between your award of economic damages and your
award of noneconomic damages.
In analyzing the severity and length of harm, you may also consider:
a. The degree of physical and emotional harm caused by the injury;
b. Whether the harm will likely increase or decrease over time;
c. Whether the harm caused the plaintiff to become physically or finan-
cially vulnerable;
d. Whether the harm caused the plaintiff to exist in a vegetative state; and
e. Whether the harm caused permanent disability, disfigurement, blind-
ness, loss of a limb, paralysis, cognitive disabilities or other trauma.
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You must use your judgment to decide a reasonable amount of damages based
on the evidence presented in the case and your common sense. However,
you should be aware that the legislature of this State has limited the amount
of compensatory damages that can be recovered in this type of case. You
should not, however, feel obligated to limit your compensatory damage
award based on this information.
The jury constitutes the “black box” of the American justice system and plays
an important role in American jurisprudence.391 The essence of trial by jury is that
controverted facts are to be decided by a jury. Some states have effectively abol-
ished the civil jury trial right to damages that exceed a cap. Even though courts
permit legislatures flexibility when making changes to the jury practice, legislative
action that is clearly erroneous should not be blindly or forever followed. The
Framers of the federal Constitution sought independence in part due to the Crown’s
deprivation of the “benefits of trial by jury.”392 One benefit (or burden) of the civil
jury trial right is judgment as the jury sees fit. Only fair procedures and clear
instructions will endear confidence in the jury’s award. This instruction is intended
as a starting point and courts should be free to consider other instructions that focus
on the individualized facts of a case.
C. Theory 3
The third rationale for uncapping compensation in the Gore punitive damage
analysis is the failure of cap legislation to allow the civil jury to reconsider or
confirm an award that exceeds the cap. State and federal courts agree that “damages
must be assessed by the jury” if the cause of action is analogous to a common law
case that existed at the time of ratification of the State or Federal Constitution.393 At
the time the Federal Constitution was ratified in 1791, the parties in common law
cases were entitled to have a jury determine liability and damages—both of which
were questions of fact.394 In other words, both parties were entitled to have a jury
determine “the question of liability and the extent of the injury by an assessment of
391 White, supra note 360, at 136.
392 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
393 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 478 (1935). Dimick involved personal injuries caused
by the alleged negligent operation of an automobile on a public highway. Id. at 475. The
plaintiff argued the jury’s $500 award was inadequate and requested a new trial. Id. The
motion was denied immediately after the defendant consented to a $1000 increase in damages.
Id. at 475–76. A Seventh Amendment violation occurred because the trial court lacked
authority to condition the denial of a new trial on defendant’s agreement to an increase of
damages. Id. at 476.
394 Id.
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damages.”395 Additionally, common law courts lacked authority to alter the civil
jury’s damage award in an action for personal injury.396
A jury determination of disputed facts is the essence of the civil jury trial
right,397 which is derived from the Magna Carta.398 A jury determination of disputed
facts also constitutes a core common law practice. In the common law and in early
colonial practice, once the right to the jury attached certain questions required a jury
determination.399 State courts agree with federal jurisprudence that a civil jury is
required for actions that are analogous to “[s]uits at common law,” as opposed to
cases traditionally tried in courts of equity or admiralty.400
Most states also agree that both the nature of the action401 and the remedy sought
must be examined in order to determine where a case would have been tried.402 Under
395 Id. at 486; see also id. at 478 (“[I]n all cases sounding in damages these damages must
be assessed by the jury and not by the court independently thereof.”); id. at 490 (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Seventh Amendment’s purpose as preserving “the essentials of
the jury trial as it was known to the common law before adoption of the Constitution”). It
appears that, in some cases, authority was exercised to increase or abridge the jury’s award,
but only where the amount of damages was certain. Id. at 479. This rule did not apply in
personal tort actions unless the evidence before the court required a correction of the amount
of damages. Id. Thus, unless the parties agree, courts had no power to add or reduce damages
to a reasonable sum where a new trial was requested. Id. at 480; see also Murphy, supra note
279, at 746 (describing jury fact-finding as not an ends in itself, but a means towards achiev-
ing just adjudication); Murphy, supra note 9, at 363 n.83 (citations omitted) (arguing that
based on precedent, the Court “considers assessment of compensatory damages to be more
fundamental to the right to jury trial than the determination of liability”).
396 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476–77 (examining preratification reports and failing to find any
general authoritative decision sustaining the power of an English court to increase the
amount of damages fixed by a jury). To the extent that judicial discretion existed to abridge
or supplement a jury’s verdict, such discretionary authority was rarely exercised. Id. at 480.
When an award was excessive, it was unusual for a court to suggest a sum to prevent the
necessity of a new trial. Id.; see also Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 994–95
(C.P. 1677) (“By the law the jury are the judges of damages . . . .”).
397 Lerner, supra note 340, at 844 (citing Bothwell v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 102 N.E. 665,
669 (Mass. 1913)).
398 Id. at 820.
399 Id. at 817 (explaining that the common law reserved questions of fact for the jury).
400 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). Tull involved claims for violation
of the Clean Water Act, which protected pollution into navigable waters and its adjacent
swamps, marshes, bogs, and other similar areas. Id. at 414 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344,
& 1362(7); 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(a)(1)–(7), (c) (1986)). The defendant unsuccessfully
demanded a jury. Id. at 415. After a fifteen day bench trial, the judge concluded that the
defendant illegally filled in wetland areas and ordered injunctive relief. Id. at 415–16. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of a jury. Id. at 416. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict between the circuits on the issue of whether the Seventh Amendment’s
civil jury trial guarantee applies “‘when the United States sues . . . to collect a [statutory
civil] penalty.’” Id. at 416–17 (citation omitted).
401 Id. at 417.
402 Id.
2015] UNCAPPING COMPENSATION IN GORE PUNITIVE DAMAGE ANALYSIS 89
this approach, a court must first ask whether the cause of action is similar to eighteenth-
century cases brought in courts of law prior to the merger of law and equity in the
English common law.403 Next a court must ask whether the requested remedy is legal
or equitable in nature.404 It is firmly established that in the common law private
wrongs such as torts were brought in courts of law, not equity or admiralty.405
Compensatory damage caps abolish the right to a jury determination of damages
over a certain amount.406 Blackstone’s principle argument in favor of juries was to
prevent arbitrary and capricious interference of the government.407 State and federal
bills of right included the civil jury trial among the individual rights retained by the
people.408 Yet, the current state supreme court split on the constitutionality of
compensatory damage caps exists even among courts interpreting identical constitu-
tional civil jury trial clauses.409
This Article suggests that the Gore punitive damage analysis should be un-
capped where a civil jury has not been allowed to reconsider or confirm its award
of compensatory damages. The Gore punitive damage analysis should also be un-
capped where a jury has had such opportunity and still returns an award that exceeds
the cap. Many states prohibit informing the jury of the existence of the cap.410 Only
403 Id.
404 Id. at 417–18. The Tull Court reasoned that “[a]fter the adoption of the Seventh
Amendment, federal courts followed the English common law in treating the civil penalty
suit as a particular type of an action in debt, requiring a jury trial.” Id. The Court warned its
analysis was not precise. Id. at 421. The goal was not to engage in an “‘abstruse historical’
search for the nearest [eighteenth]-century analog.” Id. (citation omitted). The relief sought
was more important than finding a precise common law analogy. Id. The Court held that the
government’s demand for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act was clearly analogous
to debt actions that could be enforced in a court of law. Id. at 422–23. But the right to a jury
was not deemed to apply to all questions. Tull distinguished findings on liability from
findings on the amount of the fine. Id. at 425 (explaining that defendant has a “constitutional
right to a jury trial to determine his liability on legal claims”). Tull found no right to a jury
assessment of the penalty itself. Id. at 425–26. On this question the common law offered no
resolution. Id. In the U.S. legal tradition civil penalties were fixed by Congress. Id. at 426.
Nor was the assessment of a civil penalty an essential function of a jury. Id. at 426–27
(describing the assessment of a civil penalty as “highly discretionary calculations” that were
traditionally performed by judges).
405 Lens, supra note 323, at 601.
406 Murphy, supra note 9, at 349–50.
407 Lerner, supra note 340, at 832–33 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*379).
408 Id.
409 Id. at 841 (citing Beers v. Beers, 4 Day 535, 539 (Conn. 1823)); see also id. at 843 (citing
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga 194, 208 (1848) (“There is no invasion or infringement
of the Constitution so long as trial by jury is not directly or indirectly abolished.”)).
410 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (West 2015);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (2015); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (West
2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2015), declared unconstitutional by Watts v. Cox. Med.
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Massachusetts allows the jury to consider whether application of the cap is just or
fair to the plaintiff.411 Thus, in all cap regimes but Massachusetts, the jury’s award
will be ignored even where a party has successfully proven damages.412
This Article proposes the following instruction urging a jury to reconsider or
confirm its award of compensatory damages:
Members of the Jury:
I’m going to ask that you continue your deliberations to reconsider or
confirm the reasonability of your compensatory damage award. You should
be aware that the legislature of this State has limited the amount of com-
pensatory damages that can be recovered in this type of case. You should
not, however, feel obligated to limit your compensatory damage award
based on this information. This instruction is given as a guide for continu-
ing your deliberations.
No juror is expected to abandon an honest belief that he or she may have
as to the weight or effect of the evidence. But after full deliberation and
consideration of the evidence in the case, it is your duty to award a reason-
able amount of damages. You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as
the occasion may require and should take all the time which you may feel
is necessary.
I will ask now that you retire once again and continue your deliberations with
these additional comments in mind. Of course, this instruction is to be ap-
plied in conjunction with all of the previous instructions I have given to you.
This instruction finds its inspiration in the Allen charge in criminal cases.413 The
Allen charge is an award-inducing instruction that is commonly used when a crim-
inal jury is unable to reach an acceptable verdict.414 The Allen charge has been ap-
proved as a “subtle method of encouraging jurors to reach awards.”415 Some courts
have expressed concern about the coercive nature of the Allen charge, but its use as
Ctr., 576 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN.
1978 § 41-5-6 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West 2015); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-42-02 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23 § 61.2 (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West 2012).
411 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2015).
412 See Yeazell, supra note 10, at 1784; Thomas, supra note 153, at 1235–37.
413 See generally Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
414 Karen P. O’Sullivan, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, 37 ME. L. REV. 167,
167 (1985).
415 Id.
2015] UNCAPPING COMPENSATION IN GORE PUNITIVE DAMAGE ANALYSIS 91
a method of avoiding the expense of a new trial has continued.416 Like that which
has been previously proposed, this instruction is intended as a starting point. Courts
should be free to consider other instructions that emphasize the individualized facts
of a case.
CONCLUSION
Whether and to what extent the Court will recognize that compensatory damage
caps implicate the Gore punitive damage analysis remains unknown. Neither general
claims of excessiveness nor a medical malpractice “crisis” appears to justify the im-
position of capped compensation in all or even a certain category of common
law–based tort cases. Caps result in a damage award that is arbitrary or trivial. Cap
legislation presumes excessiveness and only prevents awards that exceed a certain
amount (even if evidence exists to support the jury’s higher award).417 Individual
review upon necessity is essential to any method that allows reconsideration of a
civil jury’s award, which is a key failure of state law compensatory damage caps.
This Article advocates uncapping compensation in the Gore punitive damage
analysis under three circumstances. First, where trial judges are not allowed to
review a civil jury’s award for reasonableness (or if the trial judge has had such
opportunity and confirms an award that exceeds the cap). Second, if the civil jury
has not been informed of the existence of a compensatory damage cap (or if the civil
jury has been so informed but still returns an award that exceeds the cap). Finally,
where the civil jury has no opportunity to reconsider or confirm an award that
exceeds the cap (or where the civil jury has had such opportunity and affirmed an
award that exceeds the cap). Without such protections, the Gore punitive damage
analysis fails to advance its dual obligation in civil litigation to one, protect civil
defendants against unreasonably high awards, and two, guard severely injured
plaintiffs against arbitrarily low awards.
416 Id. at 168–73.
417 See Murphy, supra note 9, at 347–51.
